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Violence in Haiti : “What interests the armed gangs is chaos”

Since the end of February, the heavily armed gangs that are proliferating in Haiti have regrouped to attack strategic targets. The security and political crisis now seems to have reached a point of no return.

Analysis of the situation by Frédéric Thomas (CETRI) in the L’Obs (translation of an interview by Manon Bernard).

Blood continues to flow in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The United Nations High Commissioner, Volker Türk, denounced a situation “unsustainable for the Haitian people” before the Security Council this Wednesday, March 6, specifying that 1,193 people have been killed since the start of 2024 because of gang violence.

Tuesday evening, an influential Haitian gang leader, Jimmy Chérizier, nicknamed “Barbecue” threatened a “civil war” if Prime Minister Ariel Henry did not resign. The latter, who left on a diplomatic trip to Kenya, is still stuck in Puerto Rico, the Port-au-Prince airport refusing to welcome him. How far can these armed bands go ? Can they seize power ?
Frédéric Thomas, doctor in political science and researcher at the Tricontinental Center (CETRI) in Louvain-la-Neuve in Belgium, returns to the situation for “l’Obs”.

How did the armed gangs operating today manage to proliferate in Haiti ?

Gangs have existed in Haiti for a long time. Just like their structural links with political and economic elites. There was first a privatization of violence in the 1960s, with the Tonton Macoutes, a sort of parallel police force who did not depend on the hierarchy of the police institution but directly on the power of President François Duvalier. Under Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Chimères appeared, young people from working-class neighborhoods. These armed groups used by the government ensured control of the territory and a clientele for deputies and other politicians.

For about six years, these gangs have controlled more territory but also have more members. They also use more sophisticated weapons like drones. Through this power, they have partly empowered themselves.

The immediate origin of these more recent groups is the Saline massacre in November 2018 where 71 people were killed. It takes place in a working-class neighborhood as part of mass demonstrations against corruption, impunity and inequality. It is seen as an example of the instrumentalization of the parallel armed forces by the power in place.

Is the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 a turning point in gang violence ?

We have the impression that the situation is deteriorating at this time, but that is not true. A few weeks before the assassination there was a wave of violence which hit Port-au-Prince where dozens of people were killed.

We also see that the power of the armed gangs who killed Jovenel Moïse is linked to this first massacre at La Saline with the complicity of the police. They will go ever further by uniting, gaining territories and members, arming themselves more, resorting more to kidnappings.

After the assassination of Jovenel Moïse, the arrival to power of Ariel Henry was immediately contested by the population. And its social, political, economic and security results are catastrophic. In 2023, the number of assassinations, homicides and kidnappings will almost double. And January 2024 was the bloodiest month in the last two years according to the UN.

The deterioration of the island’s security is amplified by a coalition of gangs. What is the point of these armed bands coming together and attacking ?

There are several hundred gangs. It is estimated that this coalition is made up of around 23 large armed bands and two large coalitions including the G9 at the head of which we find Jimmy Chérizier, a former politician who quickly became public enemy number 1. What is new are the coordinated attacks which target symbolic strategic sites : prisons, airport, police academy, etc.

Could this coalition take over the government of Haiti ?

They have anti-government and revolutionary rhetoric but no political projects. What interests them is chaos. It is to ensure that there is no State or public institutions that control and repress them. They thrive on this state inaction and the impunity they enjoy to develop.

In addition, the armed bands, even if Haiti is very centralized, remain concentrated in Port-au-Prince and in Artibonite, a department north of the capital. We find some elsewhere but they have no national reality.

Some media take armed gangs who have anti-government speeches at their word. They attribute to them a political aim that the gangs do not have. We must not fall into the trap : this is not a war between the gangs and the government, it is a war of the gangs against the population, in which the government and the international community have a large responsibility. These armed gangs remain made up of mafiosi who rule through terror and resort to systematic violence.

What should the UN Security Council, meeting behind closed doors this Wednesday, do ?

The international community, led by the United States, stubbornly supported the government of Ariel Henry without listening to opposition or recognizing the unpopularity and illegitimacy of this government. What can be read through the bankruptcy of Ariel Henry’s government is therefore the bankruptcy of international strategy. There is a race against time : if Ariel Henry does not manage to land in Port-au-Prince, it will mark the complete failure of this strategy.

Today, there is no transition or elections in sight. Either the international community continues in its headlong rush by precipitating the arrival of an international force, or it continues to encourage a political agreement around Ariel Henry with a view to elections. But many actors don’t want that.

What the international community could do would be to finally agree to go through a disruptive transition and fight against the impunity on which armed groups feed.

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Les opinions exprimées et les arguments avancés dans cet article demeurent l'entière responsabilité de l'auteur-e et ne reflètent pas nécessairement ceux du CETRI.