CETRI
On 7 August 2024, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the Move Forward Party and banned its executives from holding political office. In doing so the court has positioned itself as the country’s arbiter of truth, ethics and national interests.
Move Forward, Thailand’s largest parliamentary party, pledged to reform the lese majeste law — a law that makes it a crime to defame or threaten the Thai monarch in the country’s criminal code. Move Forward’s position was challenged by the Election Commission and was found to be illegal by the court.
A week later on 14 August, the Constitutional Court ruled that Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin had committed serious ethical violations of the Constitution by nominating Pichit Chuenban — lawyer and former advisor to Srettha — to a ministerial post, and the court subsequently removed Srettha from office along with his Cabinet.
These decisions signal that the way Thailand is currently politically, economically and socially configured is the best Thailand will be for the foreseeable future. There will be no reforms of consequence that touch upon the royal institution. Any Thai pushing for progressive change of the current status quo will either face the full gauntlet of Thai state power or have to leave the Kingdom.
The sort of reform and change called for by the student protests of 2020–21 will not come from the bottom or it would be met with state violence. Reform and change from within the political or parliamentary system using democratic methods will not be allowed as any party threatening the status quo will be dissolved.
Nor will the system reform itself from the top, as any change to the constitution must go through the Constitutional Court and against the self-interests of political actors. Open calls for reform from at least one senior statesman reflect fissures within the Thai elite but these calls fall on deaf ears.
The court in its recent verdict stated that Move Forward’s policy platform of Section 112 reform ‘may’ or ‘might’ bring into question the standing of the royal institution as well as threaten state security by not stipulating whether reform of the Constitution would separate sections 1 and 2. Given that no concrete law had been proposed in parliament, by looking into what ‘may’ or ‘might’ happen in the future, the court may have preempted any possible attempts to even consider altering any laws regarding the royal institution.
It would appear the Thai Constitutional Court has placed itself as an arbiter above the legislative and executive branches of government in the constitutional balance of power. By definition, it is also the de facto final arbiter as it is shielded by a previous law protecting it from any and all criticism.
Some of the court’s justices consider their position as that of protecting the state and its institutional integrity from all threats. In essence, they have placed themselves as judicial guards above reproach and the whims of corrupt institutional politics. In January, the court ruled that Move Forward must cease and desist from any mention of Section 112 reform. The court has effectively set a precedent for its ability to rule over what policies a party can campaign on and which the parliament can consider.
With respect to the verdict concerning Srettha, the ruling demonstrates that the court is willing to insert itself into legislative and executive areas as well as pre-election campaigns.
The court also referred to the dissolution of Move Forward as going against the opinions of ‘academics, politicians and diplomats’, arguing that the Thai context is specific and deserves deeper understanding. This is a rehash of the old trope that Thailand is somehow different from all other countries and thus should be insulated from international criticism. But it also shows awareness of the charged external environment and specifically mentions all those who stand in opposition to the court. The court simply does not care because it believes it is acting in the best interest of the Kingdom.
The dissolved Move Forward Party made a seamless transition into the new People’s Party by taking along all remaining 143 members of parliament. New party leader, 37-year-old Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, vowed that the party would continue with proposals within parliament for Section 112 reforms. The progressive movement against Thailand’s entrenched elite continues.
Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court is considering a petition by the Ombudsman on behalf of dissolved People Reform Party founder Paiboon Nititawan on the legality of a 2001 Memorandum of Understanding with Cambodia to negotiate overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand. Government officials are signalling that the court may issue an ‘advisory opinion’ — which it does not have the legal power to do — to undermine the legal standing of the agreement. Nonetheless, the main takeaway is that the court is usurping the powers of other branches of government. In this case, the court is hearing Nititawan’s argument, even though he has no standing to petition as he is not a directly injured party as per the legal statute.
These same officials are of the mind that the court views itself as a barrier against misconduct, arbiter of wisdom and guardian of Thai national interests. If the court inserts itself into this arena it will very likely throw Thailand’s foreign relations into the same realm of instability as its domestic politics.
