CETRI
In July 1970, the current Omani ruler Sultan Qaboos Bin Sa‘id b. Taymur Al-Sa‘id with support from British officials in Oman and a number of Omani tribes overthrew his father Sultan Sa‘id b. Taymur. Qaboos was 29 years old. His rule since then has been identified as a new era, marked to a large part by the formation of Oman as a “modern State” and a “new dawn”. This new era was, and has continued to be, constructed in direct opposition to the previous era, which has been characterized as “backwardness and isolation”. This period is officially designated as (and repeatedly pronounced to be) the ‘Omani renaissance’ or “al-Nahda al-‘Umania”. While there is no doubt that Omani society has undergone significant changes that have touched almost every aspect of life, it is also true that during the last three decades or so of the 1970 political change the State has concerned itself more on the building of the country’s infrastructure and devoted less attention to the human development of its citizens. In addition to the development of basic infrastructure, and with heavy dependence on oil revenues, the government has provided its citizens with so-called “free services” such as jobs, free health care, education, and subsidized housing. Over time, Omani society has become increasingly dependent on such services, with the result that the more services that are offered, the more loyal society has become to the State. Politically, this system enables the government to both attain legitimacy through these “achievements”, while simultaneously building a network of alliances. These alliances include collective, tribal, religious, and economic interests. As a result of the speed of change in addition to the State’s greater controls on its subjects, very little room remains for criticism and resistance to the State’s authoritative nature. Therefore, for around the last three decades of the Omani renaissance, the political and social structure in Oman has obstructed the emergence of collective and actively resistant groups to State authority.
Yet, the last few years have witnessed the emergence of what guardedly might be called an individual resistance to the State’s authoritative role in the development of the country. In particular, generations born after 1970, who have not experienced the difficulties faced by Omani society prior to that, have started to engage critically on many issues that until a few years ago were seen as taboo. While local media, including newspapers and television channels in Oman are almost in their entirety controlled by the State, the internet provides relatively more room for free writing and expression of critical opinion to the State’s long established traditional ideology. The following examples exemplify the emergent tension between Omani authority and a number of internet-activists.
In March 2009 the Omani journalist and internet activist Ali al-Zwuaidi (known online as Bin Daris) was put on trial, sentenced to 10 days imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of 250 Omani Rials (OMR) (around 408 Pounds sterling ). He was however released from prison immediately after sentencing as he had already spent 11 days on remand following his arrest. Allegedly al-Zwuidi violated Article 61 of the Omani Communications Law. The offence carries a sentence of up to one year imprisonment and a fine of 1000 OMR. Al-Zwuidi was a supervisor on the internet discussion forum, « Sablat Oman ». He was alleged to have committed two crimes ; the first, allowing publication of an article dealing with suspicions of corruption in the Omani telecommunications company “Omantel”, this was based on a complaint filed by the executive manager of the company Mohammed Bin Ali al-Wuhaibi [1], and the second, leaking the confidential Council of Ministers document that related to a radio program called « Hadha al-Sabah » (This Morning) (a show that had earlier been used as a forum for members of the public to criticize Government performance live on air). Article 61 of the Omani telecommunications law, amended in 2008, stipulates that such a crime : "is punishable by prison for at least one year, and a fine of no more than 1000 OMR, this being applicable to “anyone who uses a system on a device or a means of communication to direct a message while knowing it is untrue or which causes harm to a person or service”.
Al-Zwuidi’s case attracted wide public attention in Oman and was a topic of discussion on a number of Arabic television channels such as Al Arabiya [2] and Alhurrah [3] . It was viewed by many as yet another official attempt to further restrict freedom of expression in Oman, particularly that offered by the internet. Following al-Zwuidi’s trial, the “Oman Writers Association” organized a two day workshop on, “words between freedom and responsibility”, in which a number of Omani bloggers expressed their fears and aspirations regarding the level of freedom in the country [4]. But more importantly the workshop, which was critical towards a number of restrictive laws such as the 1984 law of information, was probably the first of its kind to take place in contemporary Omani society. The unusual workshop, - which managed to bring together activists, writers, journalists, lawyers and a number of academics including some government employees- was also covered quite extensively by local newspapers and internet forums. The message of the assembled was clear ; Omanis deserve better laws to govern the activities of civil society, civil liberty and particularly freedom of speech and expression. On this occasion however the government acknowledged public criticism and confrontation somewhat differently. With the exception of reports concerning the interrogation of one of the workshop’s speakers employed by the Ministry of Information, the workshop proceeded peacefully. Further criticism of the government was continuously published on different internet forums and to a lesser extent in local daily Arabic newspapers.
Al-Zwuidi’s legal case was not the first ; in 2007 the Omani police arrested the founder of the country’s former most popular chat room web site “al-Sablah al-Omania” and 10 of his associates for publishing comments critical of government officials. After a four-month trial, the Court of First Instance acquitted the founder and three co-defendants of charges of slander but fined the six other defendants and sentenced one defendant to incarceration for a period of one month. It is true that several sites served as substitutes for al-Sablah, all were rigorously cautious concerning content, with moderators’ reportedly quickly deleting potentially offensive material. While initially many people demonstrated their frustration and resentment against the 2007 trial by anonymously commenting on internet forums, this later developed into a wide public outcry which lobbied people from social, religious, intellectual and legal backgrounds. Discussion was moved to a deeper level - than the simple “agree or disagree” replies with what was happening- highlighting legal and political obstacles concerning freedom of civil liberties’ in Oman, particularly in relation to freedom of the press, speech and writing.
It seems that since then political restrictions have eased somewhat and more and more critical articles are apparent through various channels including newspapers and internet forums. So, for the last few years local media and internet users have been enjoying relatively more freedom than they used to. For instance, during the mentioned case of Ali Zuwaidi, al-Shabiba news paper published a number of articles criticizing the way the government was dealing with the case. In one such article Saeeda Khater wrote “what Ali al Zuwaidi’s case has done is that it has brought out to the cold reality of daylight, for the whole world to see, the huge disconnect in Oman between what the people think and care about and what the government controlled media provides to them”. Also, in June 2009 the Omani writer and human rights activist Salim al-Tuwaiyya published an article entitled “Law of Association Obstructs the Establishment of Civil Society in Oman” [5]. Salim is one of few Omanis who have had the courage to speak out even if their dialogue is confrontational towards the Omani government. His article was published in one of the more popular internet-forums, “al-Harrah al-‘Umaniya” (http://alharah.net/alharah/t8825.html). Salim’s lengthy article was ‘in Omani terms’ very critical towards the government and can be very briefly summarized as “there is no such thing as civil society ‘Mujtama‘Madani’ in Oman”. Salim questions the meaning of, “independent organization,” in Oman, asserting that it means nothing. “The best way to define civil society and independent organizations - Salim sarcastically states- is to call all organizations in the country ; government owned organizations” [6] . According to him, this is because “the Omani government is financially involved in every one, and such an involvement places doubt on repeated government rhetoric concerning independent organizations and civil society”. Similarly and only a few days before the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the Omani blogger and journalist Mu‘awiyya al-Rawahi touched on what is considered in Oman to be a taboo topic, that of alcohol consumption, asking “when is the Omani-government going to peacefully allow the selling of alcohol ? He accused both the government and conservative Islamist’s of being hypocritical regarding the alcohol issue [7] as “although Omanis are allowed to consume alcohol in bars and authorized restaurants, they unlike foreigners are prevented from purchasing it directly from liquor shops…” [8] Three days after Ma‘awiay’s article, a leaked government document posted on ‘Sablat ‘Uman’ suggested that the Ministry of Higher Education was granting free government scholarships to relatives of certain influential officials “despite the fact that they did not qualify for them by their own merits”. These examples and other political, economic, social and religious issues, such as ; the political future of Oman after Sultan Qaboos, the relationship between religious and political authority in Oman, gay rights, social equality and marriage, corruption in the public sector and so forth, have over the last two years or so become popular topics for discussion on forums, inviting ‘open debate’ on topics many previously considered taboo or at least sensitive, and interestingly most participants are teenagers and young adults, who write using genuine names rather than anonymously. For instance, a woman who graduated with a BA in Law from the United Kingdom, Basmma Said al-Kumi became a leading example for many women when she openly criticized the legal and social situation of women in Oman, asking for fairer laws and cultural reform dealing with women’s status in the country.
Nonetheless as one famous blogger emphasized, what appears to be a tranquil atmosphere between the government and activists utilizing the internet to criticize them could be no more than “the calm before the storm" [9] . Such a comment reveals the concerns of many people who engage in writing critically on what is seen as sensitive topics, there is always the anxiety that this phase of uneasy acceptance will end in confrontation. It could be said that many Omanis who use the internet still feel that there is always a threat that the government will prosecute the authors for their statements, even if they are posted anonymously. As one anonymous user of a local internet site wrote, “there is a long way to go before Omanis can achieve the freedom of expression they have been writing about”. So, the earlier mentioned discussions relating to sensitive topics with unusual approaches could easily (both politically and culturally) be considered dangerous and writers who attempt to highlight such issues might be putting themselves at risk. Thus, what can be said here is that although many changes have occurred in Oman since 1970, the socio- political and legal structure of the contemporary Omani State does not support critical engagement and free speech. For instance, while Article 29 of the State’s Basic Law guarantees “freedom of opinion and expression … within the limits of the Law.” “Material that leads to public discord, violates the security of the State or abuses a person’s dignity and his rights” may not be printed or published, the 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the government to censor publications deemed politically, culturally, or sexually offensive. Internet use in Oman is regulated by Omantel’s Terms & Conditions, which mandate that users must “not carry out any unlawful activities which contradict the social, cultural, political, religious or economical values of the Sultanate of Oman or could cause harm to any third party.” Any abuse or misuse of the Internet Services will “result in the termination of the subscription and/or in the proceedings of Criminal or Civil lawsuits against the Customer. In 2009, following a number of incidents (mentioned in the opening of this article) local internet-websites urged the government to loosen its control on the media and allow crime and corruption to be exposed in the local press [10]. Their aspiration was to seek “open debate on topics ranging from religious sensitivity to corruption of government officials”. The “collaborative partnership of four leading academic institutions or The Open Initiative”, went further, to describe the internet situation in Oman asserting that, “The Sultanate of Oman engages in extensive filtering of pornographic web sites, gay and lesbian content, and anonymizer sites used to circumvent blocking. The censors have added content that is critical of Islam and web sites on illegal drugs to the blacklist. Although there is no evidence of technical filtering of political content, laws and regulations restrict free expression online and encourage self-censorship”.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that since 1970 wide change has taken place in Oman ; infrastructure and basic services have developed tremendously. Yet, Oman still remains distanced from democracy and thus, civil liberties and genuine political participation and cultural reform are lacking behind the infrastructural development. Demand for and the aspirations of many educated Omanis for genuine political and cultural reform is increasing, while the obstruction of such demands and aspirations are also high. Reform in Oman has since 1970 been instructed from above as the Sultan has kept the exclusive power in his own hands, thus, there has been little space for the establishment of independent organizations.
Thus, political and cultural reforms in Oman are critical. Political legitimacy through democratic institutions is essential. Constitutional monarchy in Oman could be one realistic alternative to absolutism. A constitutional monarchy could bring balance in power between the government and its subjects through the process of an elected parliament with clear vision and power. This process should be parallel to the development of modern institutions based on changes in the power structure of society, namely, the emergence of multiple centers of economic and political power, and the enhancement of the role of civil society. Modern societies are vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social or cultural order. Genuine political determination must exist together with a genuine desire for progress, if serious reform in Oman is to proceed in a manner consistent with its 1970 commitment to modernization.
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