CETRI
In Niger, civil society generally refers to non-profit associations, legally recognized as such by the government. They pursue various interests under the leadership of individuals, which are known as “civil society actors”. These are joined by another kind of “new actors” that animate virtual public space through internet and social media platforms, identifying themselves as whistleblowers, activists, bloggers, and influencers. Followed by tens of thousands, they provide sometimes reliable information with the potential to forewarn national as well as international public opinion. In the context of governance as well as in the field of human right advocacy, it happens that civil society opposes to certain political decisions to the point of potentially putting the government in an uncomfortable situation, thus acting as a true counterweight.
However, since the 26 July 2023’s coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, we uncover with astonishment a civil society that unconditionally supports the military junta. Some of these actors, well-known for their commitment to strengthening democracy, have paradoxically decided to bring them their support despite the dismantling of [democratic] institutions. Through a circumstantial alliance, both civil society and the junta attempt to justify the Coup by denouncing the presence of foreign military bases and by emphasizing the poor political governance of former regimes as well as their chronic difficulties in resolving insecurity issues [1]They refer to the presidencies of Mahamadou Issoufou and Mohamed Bazoum. The latter being especially challenged by the militaries, whereas the actors from civil society tend to vilify the presidency of Mahamadou Issoufou.
In Burkina Faso as in Mali, democratically elected regimes have experienced the same outcome. Niger’s Coup therefore suggests a certain “contagion effect”, which president Bazoum was not able to foresee despite alarming signs. Thus, the security crisis in the Sahel has triggered the collective collapse of the three countries most affected by jihadist group activism, namely Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In addition to this crisis, which has showcased military juntas in the justifications of coups d’état, it is mainly denunciations, contestations and protests by civil society that have highly contributed to weaken the regimes in these countries.
The “return” of military coups in the Sahel region was seen as an opportunity for some African activists and intellectuals to step up stage to incriminate liberal democracy, perceiving it as inadequate for African states. In the case of Niger, such accusatory discourse is the consequence of the failure of multipartyism, which has brough an elite to power without enabling it to address security and development challenges. Many Nigeriens believe that liberal democracy has nurtured the advent of a political class unaware of its responsibilities and has proved to be corrupt. As stated by political scientist Rahmane Idrissa, “In the Nigerien-style democracy, party leaders compete to gain the exercize of state power from voters for purposes other than the country’s development”. [2]
In this context, civil society’s enthusiasm to support the military junta is understandable as it sets the same type of hope by projecting itself as an alternative to a corrupt political class despised by populations.
Thus, are we witnessing both a return of military coups as well as a shift of civil society’s role towards the political sphere ? Civil society used to contribute to the advent of democracy in Niger, but nowadays, it tolerates a military junta, relying on them to lead the state. How can this be ?
Attempting to reinvent civil society.
Attempting to reflect upon the notion of “civil society” brings back to the ambivalence of its definition as well as to the ambiguity of its operability. According to political philosophy (Hegel, Tocqueville, Habermas…), civil society is a form of political community which is differs both from family and the state.. It fosters the emergence of a space in which individual and collective freedoms are safeguarded [3].
It is what public authorities, military authorities and political groups are not, but is in fact organized in such a way as to allow citizen participation in the collective decision-making system in the same way as public actors [4]. As argued by many philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, Karl Marx), civil society and the State are two separate realities [5]. In theory, civil society does not have to meddle with political partisanship, although that in reality, it does happen to play as a counterweight to state power. [6]
Moreover, it cannot assert itself as a replacement for the political bodies that benefit from the legitimacy of elections, just as the government cannot encroach on the role of civil society. In fact, the line between the political class and civil society is porous. The role of State and the one of civil society may be distinct but are to a certain extent complementary . Said otherwise : civil society and the political class are the two faces of the same coin. The former has no permanent role, inventing its own according to the political stakes, while the latter’s mission is to address the demands of the populations through actions and decisions.
Niger provides a good example of civil society interference within the political sphere. in the public sphere. Over the past twenty years, civil society organizations have grown in importance, to the point of wanting to manage political power as was the case during the last military transition in 2010. Prior to this event, we recall the creation of the Coordination of the Forces for Democracy and the Republic (“Coordination des forces pour la démocratie et la République”), a coalition of both political parties and civil society organizations (CSO) that opposed President Mamadou Tandja’s violation of the Constitution back in 2009.
At the time, one of the most emblematic figures of civil society, Marou Amadou, president of the United Front for the Conservation of Democratic Achievements (UFSDA) and the Front’s spokesman for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), was considered the most radical opponent to Tandja’s regime. The military junta that overthrew the President in February 2010, decided to collaborate with civil society by appointing Marou Amadou as president of the National Consultative Council (NCC), the second most important body of the military transition, acting as parliament. When he seized power in 2011 after the presidential election, Mahamadou Issoufou also decided to compromise with civil society, by appointing the same Marou Amadou the Minister of Justice. This dazzling political career is not only a testatament to personal achievement, but also exemplifies the place taken by civil society.
The fluctuating forms of commitment
Civil society as played a decisive role in the advent of democracy as well as in the opening of a public space in Niger. It has also witnessed some moments of glory, such as in 2005 in the fight against the high cost of living [7]. Overall, it is recognized as playing an important role in defending human rights, resolving social and political conflicts, as well as ensuring transparency of state resources. Many civil society organizations have made the fight against corruption their banner call.
President Mahamadou Issoufou’s regime has come under attack from CSO, that shared light over corruption practices linked to security and public policies implementation. Critical, civil society became a real political opposition. Consequently, President Issoufou opted to crack down on CSO leaders, who ended up in prison. At the time, he even depicted them as putschists who had always fought democratic regimes. [8] When M62 and other organizations from the civil society denounced the ongoing presence of foreign military bases in Niger, Issoufou considered it paradoxical the fact that they did not denounce terrorism [9] . According to him, those who call for the departure of foreign forces are allies of the terrorists. [10] At least twenty activists have been jailed for demonstrating against the 2018 finance law [11] .
However, this repression discredited his presidency for the benefit of civil society that has managed to expand its audience among the populations and even within the army. This rise in power of the civil society was also made possible by the weakening of the traditional political opposition, in particular the main opponent, Hama Amadou, who was sentenced by the courts and forced into exile. On another hand, corruption scandals during the presidency of Issoufou have drastically weakened Nigerien democracy. After being elected in 2021, President Mohamed Bazoum inherited, from a discarded state, an underfunded army as well as a very politicized civil society. In this context, the military coup was foreseeable and the support from some CSOs for the junta is the result of repression during the Issoufou years. CSO such as “Let’s turn the page Niger” (“Tournons la page-Niger”) and M62 were among the first to support the Junta and mobilize the people of Niamey to demonstrate against France and the forces of Operation Barkhane.
However, no one could have imagined that civil society would refrain from demanding a brief transition leading to the election of a civilian regime. The actions and decisions of the junta (such as the creation of ASS, the retreat of ECOWAS, establishment of solidarity funds, and formation of a « Commission for Combating Economic, Financial, and Fiscal Crime » (COLDEF)) are supported by a civil society that is becoming increasingly indifferent to democracy. In doing so, it has invented a new role for itself in the recasting of the state. Even when the junta takes a wrong turn in terms of combating corruption and managing public funds, civil society struggles to make a critical voice heard. For instance, civil society did not react to the numerous human rights violations by COLDEF with the autonomous trade union of the magistrates of Niger (SAMAN) condemned these violations in a declaration, urging its members to withdraw immediately from this administrative commission [12]. Civil society has also remained silent on a suspected case involving the trafficking of over 1500 kg of gold that allegedly left Niamey airport clandestinely bound for Dubai via Addis Ababa. On his Facebook page, former Deputy Chief of Staff of Bazoum implied that the head of the junta knows to whom all this gold belongs, who it is intended for as well as who is benefiting from the transaction. [13] Such denunciations on social media have prompt the minister of justice of the junta government to provide explanations. According to the latter, police investigations will shed light on this matter [14] .
Furthermore, the M62, which accused the army of having committed a smudge back in October 2022, abstained from condemning the army bombing of the village of Tyawa (region of Tillaberi), who reportedly resulted in nearly fifty casualties. [15] In response to the junta’s adoption of an ordinance deviating from public procurement legislation, civil society has ferociously reacted through some of its actors [16]. However, this ordinance opens the door for corruption practices to take root, especially since Article 1 states that : “Expenditure for the purchase of equipment, materials or any other supplies, for works or services for the defense and security forces, and for the care of citizens who are victims of forced displacement due to insecurity, is excluded from the scope of the legislation [...]. The provisions of paragraph 1 also apply to acquisitions, works and any other services for the palace and official residences.
The shy reaction from the CSO who claim to fight corruption illustrates the changing character of their commitments. Some of these CSO, expressing vindicatory comments towards civilian regimes, have chosen to remain quiet, although others have mildly reacted. It is not without bitterness and disappointment that some donors have noticed the variations of the commitments within the Nigerien civilian society. To absolve themselves, some well-known activists reacted on social media. Maikoul Zodi stated on his Facebook page : « This ordonnance is contrary to the rebuilding. We aspire to a transparent and virtuous resource management. The Nigerien People does not deserve this.” On the other hand, Bana Ibrahim has argued on the other hand that : “There is no objective reason to adopt such an ordonnance that is nothing more than a denial of justice”.
And Ali Idrissa asked for the repeal of this ordonnance. These prominent figures of civil society, undoubtedly very embarassed, have chosen social media platforms to express themselves although they have more deterrent means (such as protests) to make themselves heard. Reactions via social media remain personal opinions that do not differ from those of an average citizen.
It is evident that these actors who have allied with the junta lack determination and seem hesitant when it comes to openly criticizing bad decisions. This behavior also reveals the limitations of certain non-autonomous and highly politicized CSOs.
However, those that are more autonomous, less politicized and have never made pacts with the junta have openly denounced the controversial ordinance. Through a public statement, an open letter to the junta leader and a press release, the NGO Initiative for Co-development with Niger (ICON-Niger Stop Corruption) and the local branch of Transparency International have strongly condemned this junta ordinance. Moreover, it is relevant to say that these two main organizations remain consistent to their stance. Without paying honors to the junta, they attempt to play their role in combatting corruption.
The identification of two or more categories of civil society organizations corroborates Issoufou’s perception that distinguishes two sorts of civil society organizations in Niger : on the one hand a pro-democratic civil society, and on the other hand, a coup-supporting civil society.
The impossible institutionalization of civil society
Unlike his predecessor, who chose repression and clientelism to neutralize civil society, President Bazoum decided to opt for a participatory and inclusive approach. He focused on institutionalizing and including civil society rather than instrumentalizing or repressing it. Since the day he took office, Bazoum sought to engage in a frank and honest dialogue with civil society regarding the nature of its relationship with the state. He was convinced that civil society could help him in achieving key objectives outlined in his agenda, such as providing education for the Youth, fighting against illegal immigration, fighting corruption, and addressing the demographic issue. He believed that an institutional relationship would have the advantage of bringing citizens closer to the state, but more importantly, of reducing state corruption. But this approach very soon came up against the country’s political realities. On the one hand, all form of institutionalization of civil society are perceived as a threat by the political class that believes it to have the exclusive right to exercise power. On the other hand, it is not easy for civil society to freely and openly participate in the governance of a regime perceived as a logical continuation of the previous one. Bazoum failed to formalize the rupture sought by most Nigeriens. Issoufou’s specter still appears to be everywhere in the management, which has not reassured CSOs that suffered much under his regime.
Is another vision on civil society possible ?
Nowadays, civil society is useful to the junta for legitimizing the coup, but the latter expresses little consideration for it. For example, irritated by CSOs’ complaints, a member of the military junta stated : “civil society actors are only there for the money, every single time, they ask for money, but the field, we don’t see what job they are accomplishing”. Also, despite its wedding of convenience with the junta, civil society only acts within a limited scope of influence. One of the reasons explaining is that CSOs that support the junta are divided within their own ranks. One fraction is grouped in the Patriotic Front for Sovereignty (FPS) while the other works within the confines of the Citizen’s Dynamic for a Successful Transition (DCTR). The previous considering the latter as the creation of the former president Issoufou. This rivalry proves that civil society has been trivialized, instrumentalized and discredited to such an extent that citizens are starting to distrust it. Civil society does not have the expertise that could effectively help the junta governing the state. Koffi Annan once said : “A strong civil society promotes responsible citizenship and makes democratic forms of government work. A weak civil society supports authoritarian rule, which keeps society weak.” Nigerien civil society meets all the criterion of structural weakness, exposing it to instrumentalization by the junta. This latter, who had originally called upon civil society to consolidate the military coup, is now wary of it and is starting to distance it from the decision-making center. The national forum that was supposed to be held did not take place and the National Consultative Council was not set up either. Civil society is in fact only represented in COLDEF and to a limited extent, within the government.
Whether waiting for political positions or not, some of its actors continue to support the junta, even in the current state of uncertainty. Lost between its premature allegiance to the junta, inclination towards politics (power), and its rejection of liberal democracy, Niger’s civil society now teeters on the edge, grasping at concepts such as sovereignty, patriotism, and state rebuilding to maintain its existence.
Translation : Maxime Crop (Maxime.De.Crop@ulb.be), student in International Relations at the University of Brussels and intern at the Centre tricontinental (www.cetri.be)
