Le Sud en mouvement

For 19 months, violence has engulfed Manipur, widely portrayed as an ethnic conflict between the majority Meitei community and the Kuki-Zo tribes. However, the journalist Greeshma Kuthar, who has been reporting from the region since May 2023, presents a different analysis. Through her investigation, she documents how the State government’s response to the unrest, particularly its handling of armed groups and community tensions, has influenced the trajectory of the conflict.

As violence spreads to new districts like Jiribam and weapons continue to circulate, Kuthar, in this insightful webinar for Frontline, examines the complex factors that determine the conflict : government policy, security forces, armed groups, and civilian populations that have led to hundreds of deaths, the displacement of over 70,000 people, and growing militarisation among Manipur’s youth. This is an edited transcript. A video version of the interview is available on YouTube as well.

Women carrying flares chant slogans during a torch rally in Imphal West on December 1, 2024. Violence in India’s northeastern State of Manipur surged this month, the latest clashes in a bitter 18-month-long conflict between ethnic forces that has killed at least 200 people.
Women carrying flares chant slogans during a torch rally in Imphal West on December 1, 2024. Violence in India’s northeastern State of Manipur surged this month, the latest clashes in a bitter 18-month-long conflict between ethnic forces that has killed at least 200 people. | Photo Credit : AFP

We have already seen one year and seven months of this kind of violence in Manipur. We’ve seen it reaching new areas—areas that were so long untouched by violence, like Jiribam. We’re getting news of it, as you had pointed out, much later after things have spread. Often the situation is that when things are too late, the rest of the country gets to know of it. Now, how did this situation become so bad ? How did it manage to escalate into this war-like situation ? Where did the Centre and the State go so horribly wrong ? Could you just give us a brief background ?

When the violence started in Manipur, we were all focussed on the Karnataka State elections in 2023, with results expected around on May 10. We were very involved with figuring out who was coming back into power there. But the violence had started in Manipur on May 3, and there was barely any focus on it. None of us took note of what was happening in Manipur. Not only did we not take note, there was no real attempt from the state—be it from the Manipur State government or the Central government—to flag it as something that had to be immediately addressed. That’s where it starts. Whether there was a build-up to the violence is an altogether separate question.

But after it started, there was continuing brutal violence in the capital itself. Lynchings were happening within the capital. Though the viral video showed something that happened on the fringes of Imphal and the hill district, there were other instances of sexual assault happening within Imphal two weeks from May 3. None of these incidents made it to the forefront of any news or media channel. That’s just one part of the story. The other part is that the State government continued to say they were trying to bring things under control, and this was echoed by statements from the Centre. So nobody really thought—or maybe that was the design—to make it seem like nothing was wrong.

I was there by the end of May. Up until July, when that viral video came out, the situation remained similar. People were saying, “Something’s happening in Manipur, but it’s just another Northeast thing,” where people just pick up weapons and do whatever. Those were the kinds of conversations I was hearing before I went to Manipur and even after, when speaking with different media agencies, individuals, or civil society groups in mainland India. The larger problem is that the response to the situation in Manipur itself was very delayed. Eventually, there was a response because of this video, which required people to suddenly realize something bad was happening. International agencies decided to speak about Manipur, and that’s when even national agencies had no choice but to report on it.

That particular incident, even in the Prime Minister’s statement, was addressed as an instance of gendered violence. It wasn’t looked at as ethnic violence. So again, for a couple of weeks it was in the news, and then people forgot. After September-October 2023, I would say things slowed down—I mean the instances of violence were spread out. But that doesn’t mean the State wasn’t burning. It has always been burning. From the time the violence started in May, nothing’s changed ; it has only gotten worse.

The different waves of violence after May 3 have had a pattern where even more violent incidents would happen. There would be desecration of bodies. People who would stray from the buffer zones and go to the other side would go missing or be abducted, kidnapped, and then found dead—shot in the head, chopped up. Every wave of violence would be gory. But nobody took notice the way they did with the viral video until this September, when media channels suddenly decided to say that weapons from the US and China were floating into Manipur and being used for a different kind of warfare. Complete exaggeration, again sensationaliSing what’s happening instead of going into the root issue, which by then was inaction and collusion of the State. It wasn’t about these weapons being used, because weapons have been used in Manipur for a long time.

Now there’s been another wave of violence in Jiribam. Another district gets pulled into the violence. But Jiribam has been burning since June—I first reported on Jiribam in June. There have been consistent patterns since the violence started about how the State has refused to intervene while saying, “Things are okay, we’re bringing it back to normal.” The Chief Minister (CM) would say he’s sending agents to talk peace to all sides—that sort of language which actually translates to nothing.

Nothing has changed in Manipur. Nothing concrete has been initiated by the Central government or the State government to address this, because this is something new to Manipur. Manipur has had smaller instances of communities going against each other, but it has never escalated this way. The large part of violence in Manipur has been the political demands of the Meitei community against the Indian State. The Meiteis going against the Nagas or the Meiteis going against the Kukis hasn’t happened at this scale anytime in the history of Manipur. I haven’t seen any initiative from either the Central or State government to address this differently.

Interestingly, you mentioned that none of the incidents really came to the forefront. Here we have to talk about the role of the media. You’ve written in your articles about the systemic practice of disinformation by the State government through the media and through its own apparatuses. Could you share with us some of your own experiences at the ground level—what you saw and what was being reported or not reported ? And what were the challenges you faced while exposing some of the atrocities ?

When I first landed in Manipur, I realized my first challenge as an independent journalist would be that by the time I figured out where I was going to report a particular incident or story, there was already a narrative floated by the State or different groups setting something contrary to the truth as the truth. What is the truth ? What is the counter-truth in reportage ? It shouldn’t be that complicated. When you’re reporting from the ground and there’s already a dearth of ground reports, it shouldn’t be that complicated to do those reports. But it was, because there was no internet in Manipur at the time and my access was restricted to going to either a DC office or finding Wi-Fi somewhere to understand what was being said. I would figure out a story, pitch it to different organizations, and by the time I filed it, I would realize that reputed news agencies had already reported on the basis of wires or whatever sources they had about a parallel reality.

I can give you an example. In September 2023—by then people should have figured this out—there was a situation in the last remaining mixed town where Meiteis, Kukis, and Nagas were still interacting. Apart from Jiribam and the violence-affected areas, they were still going to the market together. They had a similar peace committee like in Jiribam, which had decided they would not indulge in violence against each other. They wanted to keep this market town violence-free just to ensure their properties were safe, because it was a mixed town with Meitei properties, Kuki properties, and Naga properties. On September 8, I got messages—I was at the other end, in a hill district—saying they were burning down this town, Pallel. I had visited Pallel before in July and seen everybody together—Meiteis and Kukis—even at the peak of violence. When I received this message, I thought they were doing this because they wanted to separate the communities. I immediately went to Pallel.

On my way there, I saw hundreds of people walking towards Pallel, which is at the border of a hill district and a valley district. Beyond Pallel, it’s fully tribal villages. By then, people from those tribal villages adjoining Pallel had all fled deep into the hill district—around 12 villages, 1,500 people had fled. While reaching there, crossing hundreds of Meiteis walking towards Pallel, I saw houses being burnt along the way—any Kuki house was being set on fire. When I reached there, the town had been cordoned off by the Assam Rifles on all sides. Inside, I saw young boys setting houses on fire. I thought it was just about that town, just a mob that wanted to burn this place down. But it wasn’t. Earlier that day, Meitei insurgents had walked up a hill through a Naga village. They had reached the top and bombed the Kuki villages below, opening fire. There were operations against them, and 40 to 50 of these Meitei insurgents were cornered in part of that hill district.

They would have either been attacked by insurgents from the Kuki side, but that couldn’t happen because the Assam Rifles had cornered them there. The State government was aware this was happening, as the insurgents had sent SOS messages to the valley. This entire thing of burning down Pallel was orchestrated to get them out—those 40-50 people. The Manipur police got them out right in front of me. I didn’t know this while I was there ; I just thought they were burning down the place. It took me a day to understand that this entire burning of Pallel was orchestrated to create pressure on those on the ground including the Assam Rifles to get them out. The Manipur police literally escorted them out in front of me, led by the SP of that district. There were two SPs there, one from the hill district and the other side—they negotiated with the Kuki insurgent groups and with the army. The Assam Rifles, who should have gone against them, had to let them pass, even though these people had fired at the Assam Rifles as well

[Referring to a video] If I can explain : This is a village in the hill district. This particular village was fired at by insurgents who were on top of the adjoining hill. They were cornered at the edge of this village. This is a Kuki village. When they went up the hill, they were allowed to go because they were wearing police commando uniforms. When they passed by a Naga village, people thought they were cops. You can see them walking out now. That’s a police vehicle. The people around them are police. There’s another person in a blue T-shirt—he’s the SP of Tengnoupal. He tells them not to come back here and sends them off. This video was shot by someone who witnessed this. I was just 100 meters away, recording videos of the mob burning down properties, assuming this was just about the arson—but it wasn’t.

The next day, what do I see in the news ? “Assam Rifles Uses Too Much Force on Civilians.” The CM issues a statement saying this is what the Assam Rifles did and we want them to leave. Whether a paramilitary or the army is using excessive force is a question that can be raised simultaneously with what actually happened. By the time I wrote my report for The Caravan four or five days later, this was the narrative that was floating. Nobody has even acknowledged it on record. There is an FIR registered about these people coming up. But the insurgents who were rescued, who were taken out in those police vehicles, were admitted to a hospital—close to nine of them stayed there for eight days after the incident. Not one was arrested, not one of their names was included in the prosecution. It wasn’t even put on record who these people were.

By then, there had been multiple incidents where people dressed as these “decoy cops”—that was the word used for these insurgents wearing police uniform—had gone into different places, shot at people, tried to burn down properties, including government properties. They weren’t arrested even though they were visible. They only had to flee back into the valley for safety. This is the kind of situation you’re dealing with as a journalist. By the time I report about it, the state has given another version, and everybody has carried that version. This happens with anything that occurs in the valley or the hills. Even in May 2023, the only statements you see in reports are those released by the Manipur government.

For a while, even mainstream legacy agencies relied only on the journalists from Imphal, whose narrative was very similar to the State’s. Though some of these journalists were very celebrated, the fact that they weren’t doing ground reportage wasn’t picked up by many mainstream agencies. I’m still at a loss to understand why, until July, other journalists didn’t intervene. If somebody from Imphal isn’t giving you good ground reports, why aren’t people sending journalists from bureaus in Guwahati, Kolkata, or Delhi ? The only proper ground reports came from a journalist called Rokibuz Zaman from Scroll. Beyond that, legacy organizations didn’t have such reports. It’s been 19 months now. Why haven’t we critically looked at the role of journalists not just in spreading misinformation and supporting State narratives, but in understanding why journalists within a space might align with the State’s narrative out of fear or other reasons ? Manipur is a textbook example for understanding this.

When I went there, reporting wasn’t complicated. Other than the risks or threats, it’s very black and white. Despite that, if access to the place is the problem, that can be addressed. But even now, with Jiribam, after close to 20 people are killed, is it after this that people want to send journalists ? When are we going to start asking these critical questions ? Even in June, when I started reporting on Jiribam, editors would say, “It’s okay, it’s just a couple of killings, it’s just arson that’s been happening in Manipur all the time.” The fact that those were the responses I got shows that the responsibility for Jiribam becoming what it has isn’t just on State agencies and the Central government—who by design want this to continue for whatever reasons—but also on journalists who don’t want to put the focus on Manipur the way it needs to be.

You said they want this situation to be perpetuated by design. We cannot help but notice a blatantly partisan stance of the State BJP government, where it is blaming one side more than the other. We’re also seeing a kind of demonisation of the Kukis and an attempt to label them as outsiders and terrorists. At the same time, statements are being made, disinformation spread, and as you mentioned, these decoy cops face no arrests. Do you think there is a political calculation at work here to increase the wedge between the two communities for electoral reasons ?

The thing about the present Chief Minister N. Biren Singh is that he’s been a turncoat for the longest time. He started with a party called the Democratic Revolutionary People’s Party (DRPP)—he was first elected as an Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from this party. Then this party merged with the Congress in 2004 or 2005. After his stint in Congress, when he felt he wasn’t being given the importance he wanted, he joined the BJP in 2016. Even when he joined in 2016, he had a very rocky time as CM because there were people within BJP who wouldn’t support him. His second term as the CM could only happen when he got support from the Kuki MLAs and a chunk of the Naga MLAs—without them, he wouldn’t have had a majority. That’s another criticism that has been levelled at the MLAs of the Kuki groups.

If you understand how politics works in the hill districts, and in this context the Kuki districts, free will to vote is largely absent because most of the insurgent groups decide who should be elected. If you’re not endorsed by them, your chances of getting elected are minimal. So, democratic options for people in hill districts are very limited. To a large extent, these insurgent groups, especially the Kuki groups, are problematic in how they aligned with Biren almost instantly. These groups align with them because usually, regional parties or other formations in the Northeast align with the party in power at the Centre. But Biren came with his own baggage. This alliance obviously meant there were economic and business deals, because that’s how power and state institutions work in Manipur or most other States.

There were different political designs in play by the time he got his second term, while he also faced resistance from his own people in the valley. While this was happening, he worked closely with the Kuki groups for a while, then there seemed to be a falling out. Suddenly he started giving out this narrative about the Kuki tribes, using all kinds of terms to refer to them. After this fallout, he started talking about poppy cultivation when he himself has had allegations of being involved in drug cartels. A very reputed police officer from the Meitei community, an ex-officer named Brinda, has leveled allegations about his role in facilitating this trade. For him to turn around and say this community is doing this—while the trade in drugs and weapons in Manipur and other districts, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) reports, has been happening for more than two decades with everyone involved—was to create polarization within the State.

Just two weeks before the violence started in Manipur on May 3, a delegation consisting of leaders from all communities went to Delhi saying they didn’t want Biren—please remove him. This had happened before as well. Different mixed delegations had gone at different times saying Biren wasn’t the right leader. The bigger question is why the Central government, be it Home Minister Amit Shah or the Prime Minister, wants to keep him in power when he’s failing and when people within the State are saying they don’t want him as CM. How is he staying in power despite so many people turning against him ? What kind of groups is he using to threaten people ? What are his own private militia groups like the Arambai Tenggol doing to stifle dissent ? All these questions arise when trying to understand how, 19 months into the violence, Biren remains untouched.

You mentioned Arambai Tenggol. You did a deep dive into the activities and the essential socio-cultural background of this militia group in The Caravan. Recently, I think the NIA has started focusing on their activities. Their top leader has been called for questioning, but still there haven’t been any arrests of Arambai Tenggol members. We’re seeing the government giving them such a long rope. Do you think this is creating a Frankenstein’s monster that will inevitably grow beyond the government’s control and become a dangerous force unto itself ?

I think it’s already become a very big force. But it depends on the will of the State to either let them continue or stop what they’re doing. Right now, clearly nobody can question the Arambai—and when I say question, I don’t mean them attacking the community on the other side of the buffer zones, I mean attacking their own. There was a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Imphal, Amit Singh, also Meitei, who was attacked because he was investigating claims of extortion by the Arambai. Two hundred people went to his house, dragged him out, beat him up, fired shots in the air and at his house. It became a big issue in February, but nothing happened. The following days, the Manipur Police—the senior IPS officers—issued a public statement saying these guys are indulging in extortion and have a role in the violence. All of that was mentioned in the press release, but nothing happened to them.

Arambai Tenggol is one group. There’s also another faction of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) called the Pambei faction, which entered into a very sketchy peace treaty in November 2023. The CM and Home Minister announced they have done this with the UNLF, but it was only a faction. The reason it’s sketchy is because subsequently, you’ll see a chargesheet of the NIA which says another insurgent group, the Naga NSCN (I-M), played a role in bringing Meitei insurgents who were hiding in Myanmar into Manipur, and helping them acquire arms, which was subsequently used in the violence.

This is mentioned in the NIA chargesheet filed in Guwahati. They say this happened in May-June 2023. The NIA says these insurgents were brought in, and then a few months after, in November, a peace treaty is filed. In my profile of the Arambai Tenggol, people within their fold told me that the Arambai or the UNLF(P) is just a front for any insurgent from any banned group to operate within the valley right now as part of this violence. But after the violence, we don’t know what they’ll turn into. This is an open secret in the valley. On the hill side, you see the established insurgent groups—I say established because they have agreements by which the State has acknowledged their presence. Whether they have all these other armed volunteers working for them or separately is a different question. But here’s a legitimized group, that was given that legitimacy in November when the violence was still ongoing. Since then, they’ve been roaming around in QRTs, in vehicles that look like army vehicles. I’ve had people who work in the Central forces tell me that when they see them, they give them way.

Nobody—meaning state agencies—has decided yet how these people are going to be controlled, where they’ll have camps, what these cadres will do. The UNLF(P) has openly been recruiting people just like the Arambai. They put out YouTube videos saying “come and join us” and they give stipends. This particular group has been functioning openly since November. Arambai has already been there for a while, and they livestream videos on different social media platforms saying “we are going into this area, we are attacking.” There were videos of desecration that they shared, commending the acts. When there’s an attack from the Kuki-Zo side, their preparation for a counter-attack is also live streamed.

That’s how it’s become in Manipur right now—everybody is armed to the extent they can arm themselves. While on the Kuki side, though they are also armed, they are no longer interacting with the State because they are up against it. This is not a Kuki-Meitei conflict—this is a conflict between the Manipur State government led by Biren and his supporters against the insurgent groups on the Kuki side and the people. Whatever they do, they don’t have State legitimacy. But the UNLF(P) and Arambai have State legitimacy. So in Jiribam, when the peace treaty was announced, the UNLF(P) re-emerged. The Central forces there told me they fired in the air for 30 minutes in celebration. After that, there would be constant firing from November 2023 until May when a Kuki man was killed. Once he was killed, nothing immediately happened. Then within two weeks, a Meitei was killed. Within an hour there was disinformation that he was beheaded brutally, and then the Arambai and UNLF went on a rampage, burning houses and abducting one person. The Kuki-Zo fled from that area into Assam. The next day, Hmar insurgents burned down a Meitei village. The Meiteis fled to Jiribam town, and then Jiribam got bifurcated like the rest of Manipur.

Following that, the UNLF(P) and Arambai set up a spot for themselves within Jiribam town. There’s a sports university in Jiribam which is called the headquarters of the Arambai Tenggol. They had fired at the Assam Rifles in the second week of June while this arson was happening. The Assam Rifles were positioned around a school in an area called Rani Veng. The Arambai had gone up to that school and fired at them publicly. The Manipur police and Assam Rifles had identified these boys before, but no action was taken in the months that followed. In July, August, September, different incidents kept happening there. From the other side, because the UNLF and Arambai were doing this, the Kuki-Zo started coming from different parts and setting up their own spots to take on these people. This was created by the State. Who gives legitimacy to these groups ? We need to be very clear about that. These groups started firing at each other, and then you know what happened this month.

These groups are going about doing whatever they want right under the State’s nose. If these groups are only Meitei groups, then why isn’t the State—which is only Meitei right now because only they are functional and have the seat of power—doing anything to stop their own people and such groups ? There are different political designs, but there is also this legitimacy given to people from this side that is creating fresh ground for more violence. It’s very strange that every time something happens against the CM, these groups get active again. This has been reported on. Every time there is discussion of his resignation or something is said against him, suddenly there’s an incident of violence.

This has also been highlighted by particular leaders from the valley. There’s a recent interview of a National People’s Party (NPP) leader called Yumnam Singh where he says the reason for this is the State’s inaction and groups such as Arambai Tenggol provoking violence. But his statement has come so late. NPP being where they are, speaking right now also shows that the opposition parties—NPP was part of BJP until now—what are other groups doing, other political parties ? What is Congress doing other than saying “Amit Shah, Narendra Modi,” what about what’s happening in your own State ? All of these things help us draw this picture of Manipur—that there are different elements keeping the violence in play and how this violence is being engineered. That pattern hasn’t changed. Without State collusion or inaction, this would not continue. There are different ways of stopping it, but there have to be attempts. I don’t see those attempts.

You talked about the weaponizing of these various insurgent groups. It’s almost frightening—the weapons that are ceaselessly coming in. There seems to be a never-ending supply. There are reports that these are essentially from raiding State and army armories. But is there another source from which these weapons are being supplied ?

Weapons are not new to Manipur or to the insurgent groups in the Northeast. They have their set ways of getting weapons since insurgency started in Manipur—how they went from Myanmar to China, and interacted with particular groups in both countries. Kukis joined this insurgency and accessed Myanmar for weapons much later. Meiteis and Nagas started first. Their political vision and how they kept it alive along with weapons has been reported by different State agencies. There have been particular instances when they were bringing weapons into India—they’ve been intercepted, apprehended, those weapons taken away. Then it was clear where the weapons came from. There have been instances where leaders of the UNLF or People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were arrested by authorities in Myanmar and subsequently released after certain under-the-table negotiations by groups here.

Weapons have been coming into Manipur for decades until there was a push against insurgency in the 2000s, particularly against the Meitei insurgent groups, pushing them back. There were all kinds of extrajudicial killings and different forms of violence in those 10 years. Subsequently, many Meitei insurgent groups formed their camps in Myanmar. Similarly, the Naga groups and the Kuki groups, because they share ethnic ties with people in Myanmar, also had spots where they would set up camp on the other side.

By then they were in a suspension of operations agreement, so their circumstances were different compared to the Meitei insurgent groups, which were banned groups. I’ve had interactions with people who said that before the war started, Naga, Kuki, and Meitei insurgent groups on the Myanmar side would all procure weapons similarly. The agents would be the same. One group, like NSCN (I-M), would give weapons to both, or another group would give weapons to the other two. They were on speaking terms when it came to business—be it weapons, drugs, or whatever else they dealt with.

It was at the start of the civil war in Myanmar that things became complicated because people had to take sides. Right now, certain groups within India have also taken sides—some have sided with the junta in Myanmar and others with the ethnic factions among the PDFs. The suggestion that the US and China are giving weapons to factions in Manipur is hilarious—the fact that they would allege these two countries are working together here is ridiculous. Beyond that, the insurgent groups here don’t need help from elsewhere. There are weapons trade routes that have existed for a while and are familiar to all insurgent groups.

Initially, it was through the armouries on the Meitei side. Many of the major armouries are in the valley. Smaller armouries in the hill districts were also ransacked by the Kukis, but they were very small in number. The largest chunk was in the valley, which the Meitei groups, especially the Arambai and others, got. Eventually, everybody has started procuring because ammunition runs out. Though they accessed lakhs of ammunition, it still runs out. Some of the mortars and bombs fired even till date have markings showing they’re weapons taken from the government. These weapons are in circulation while newer weapons are coming in. People are figuring out how to procure weapons in whatever way. There’s no dearth of weapons on either side.

This is where we need to understand the role of the security forces, both State and Central. In the hill districts, the Central forces have always had Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in force. The AFSPA has been in Manipur since the 1980s. In the valley, it was to control the Meitei insurgent groups. AFSPA was in place where insurgent groups were going against the State. As security forces started pushing back from the late ‘90s, insurgents started going into the hill districts to hide. Tribals were helping the Meitei insurgent groups hide. That’s when Central forces, especially the paramilitary Assam Rifles, went into the hills to look for these insurgent groups while also controlling insurgent groups from the Naga or Kuki side.

This is the first time there’s a proper civil war between two groups. Now the question is how to use AFSPA when it’s in place on one side but not the other. On the hill side, Central forces have control ; on the valley side, State forces have control. By now the State forces have split communally—Meiteis are on the Valley side and the Kuki-Zo are on the hill side. There have been reports about how they’ve been used communally by the State government. You have the Assam Rifles functioning in certain parts, the CRPF and BSF under the SP operating in other parts, and them disagreeing on how to deal with particular situations. In Jiribam, that’s what happened. In Jiribam town there was no AFSPA, so I saw UNLF(P) and Arambai roaming around after knowing these people had fired at the Assam Rifles. The Assam Rifles were saying they couldn’t do anything, and the State forces refused to arrest them.

It’s only now, after the killing of that Hmar lady and subsequent killing of 10 people, six Meiteis being abducted and found floating, that the Manipur police are saying these incidents are a result of provocation by the Arambai. All of this happened because these groups were operating in an area without AFSPA. Was this difference in how forces function used to further escalate the violence ? This was understood right in the beginning, in May itself. Why was there no political will from the Central government or directions from the MHA to address this ? Senior security officers from the army and Assam Rifles told me they’ve been flagging this since May, and they just say they’re helpless now. Even though AFSPA has been reimposed in six police stations, unless there’s political will to address the situation, nothing’s going to change.

Members of the youth organisation Arambai Tenggol wave the multi-coloured “Salai Taret” flag which represents each of the seven Meitei clans as they gather to pray and take oath in front of the Ibudhou Pakhangba temple at the Kangla Fort to restore peace amid the ongoing ethnic violence in Imphal in on September 30, 2023.
Members of the youth organisation Arambai Tenggol wave the multi-coloured “Salai Taret” flag which represents each of the seven Meitei clans as they gather to pray and take oath in front of the Ibudhou Pakhangba temple at the Kangla Fort to restore peace amid the ongoing ethnic violence in Imphal in on September 30, 2023. | Photo Credit : AFP

As you said, the reimposition of AFSPA after a gap of two years in these five districts and six police stations seems more like a political gimmick to make it look as though the State is being proactive in trying to curb the violence and bring things under control. But what is AFSPA going to do now ? What can it do ?

AFSPA has had a very troubling history in the way it has been used. It’s only been associated with human rights violations, which has been flagged by multiple people within Imphal itself, within Manipur itself. How it will be used is a question I can’t answer because this is a different situation from the previous instances of violence and counter-insurgency operations in Manipur. This right now is a civil war. Again, I wouldn’t call it a Meitei-Kuki war like everybody calls it. There is a very strong role of the State government in initiating, in driving people apart and keeping those fissures in place. But coming to the role of AFSPA—like I’ve already told you—there are certain parts in the hill districts where the Central forces are in control, and in the valley it’s the Manipur police.

Even within the hill districts where the Manipur police are, there have been certain parts now given to the police to ensure violence doesn’t happen there. This means the CRPF and BSF functioning there get their orders from the SP. The Assam Rifles are an independent body. So what will happen when you have to do something together ? There have been clashes between them—they don’t see eye to eye in certain situations. Even the Assam Rifles, which is supposed to have independent will, will not do anything when told not to by the CM or Home Minister.

If there has to be clear political will to stop the violence, it needs to come from above. We have seen on multiple occasions that it isn’t happening. Take what happened in Kangla Fort, where the Arambai Tenggol summoned all the legislators. They were made to do something which again was orchestrated to give Biren more power—it was a political gimmick. When that happened, what did the MHA do, what did the interlocutor do ? They had conversations with the Arambai, and then, at Kangla, MLAs who were against Biren from the valley were beaten up.

Raghumani, who is an MLA—there are different versions floated about him—but he was one of the people who, before the violence started, went to Delhi and said please remove Biren. He was beaten up there. The Arambai was coming from different directions into Kangla, right into the fort. The Central forces who were there until the morning that day just disappeared. How did that happen ? Even in the hills, the way in which they function is very different from how forces function in the valley. Even in the spaces where AFSPA has been reimposed, there have been different times where insurgents who were apprehended had to be released because mobs would come in those numbers. This has happened only in the valley.

There have been instances where insurgents associated with certain incidents were rounded up in the hills by the Central forces and arrested. There are only a couple of people arrested in the valley. In one instance, the magistrate court was bombarded by the mob when five Meitei insurgents were arrested. And in a case where there is Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) bail was given. How many instances do we know where in FIRs with UAPA, bail is given ? But it happened in Imphal—except one guy who was rearrested later, all five were given bail. This happens when students and lawyers are languishing in jails because of UAPA across the country. What AFSPA will do, I don’t know, because I don’t think anything will change until there is clear political will. And that political will has to act against the present CM. Otherwise, I don’t see anything changing.

Can we talk about the immediate precipitant of this conflict ? We see the Meitei community’s demand for tribal status and the High Court’s rather misjudged, controversial order of 2023. Manipur is unique in that ST status is intrinsically linked more with the control of land than with other issues such as jobs. While the majority Meiteis have around 10 per cent of the land, the minority tribes have about 90 per cent. This brings to the fore certain bigger, complex, and unaddressed questions that have links to constitutional provisions and the Sixth Schedule. Could you talk about this socio-political imbroglio that Manipur is in right now—this issue of land and the Sixth Schedule with regard to Manipur specifically ?

First, there are already documents about why Scheduled Tribe status has been rejected when it comes to Meiteis. The process had already been initiated by the Central government. Abhinay Lakshman, after obtaining documents through RTI, did a report showing the government’s responses—such a request was rejected twice, once by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and then by the State government.

The Manipur State government was asked by the Ministry of Social Justice if such an inclusion should happen. First in 1982, the Office of the Registrar General of India, on a request from the Ministry of Home Affairs, looked into granting ST staus for Meiteis. And they held that the community doesn’t meet the requirements for this status. The Lokur Committee has guidelines—tribal characteristics, exclusion, geographical isolation—all these things do not apply to this community. Once again in 2001, the Manipur government agreed with the 1982 findings when asked the same question by the Ministry of Social Justice.

Even with this High Court order, the Supreme Court made them rescind that portion. So the supposed cause of this violence no longer exists on paper. But we’re not talking about this ST inclusion and what it means for this community when institutions have already said they don’t qualify. This brings us to the larger question of how asking for ST, SC, OBC statuses works. What is the basis of these requests ? How can you make such requests ? What should be the State’s response ? Are these responses only political in nature ? Any dominant community can’t randomly demand such a status—there are clear guidelines which haven’t been followed for a long time. That’s a failure of State institutions and also shows the political ploy used to create support or lobbies for particular leaders.

Coming to the cultural question—Meiteis say they used to follow an indigenous religion called Sanamahism. After a Brahmin evangelist came and converted them two and a half centuries ago, the State adopted Vaishnavite Hinduism. In the State department’s response, it says Meiteis associate with the Kshatriya caste. Even the Arambai Tenggol in all their slogans call themselves warrior blood. If Manipur, even before the British, included the hill districts within their ambit—which is what they’re saying right now—how come the people in the hill districts weren’t converted to this religion ? How come their religion remained their own until the late 1800s, when they started adopting Christianity after different Christian missionaries arrived ? This shows culturally and geographically how these communities have been separate.

The hill districts have completely followed a different cultural form and religion. This ties into how this group looked at them. Certain traits came into that society—parts of meat-eating were looked down upon. Meiteis who refused to convert were pushed to the corners, excluded, called particular names, and eventually accorded SC reservation. It’s only Manipur that doesn’t fall under the Sixth Schedule in the Northeast. Under Article 371 C of the Constitution, their Autonomous District Councils do not have as much autonomy as other hill district councils in the Northeast.

The tribes of Manipur in the hill districts, both Nagas and Kukis, have been talking about this for a long time. Because of this lack of autonomy, most decisions in these hill districts are also made by the State, unlike other Autonomous District Council (ADC) in other hill districts of the Northeast. The point of reservation is not just about access to land—it’s to neutralize the control dominant communities have on State institutions, ensuring equal representation. If you look at who works in State institutions in Manipur, tribal groups say Meiteis control most of them. A census could verify this ?

Look at the assembly, look at how the Central government has dealt with this violence—they’ve only been pandering to the CM’s narrative. That he hasn’t been removed shows certain biases. Even within the valley, the Meitei community itself is suffering. Initially, when the Arambai Tenggol targeted Kukis, they were also targeting Meitei Christians. They burned down majority of the Meitei churches in the valley, attacked Meitei Christians, made them sign affidavits saying they would convert from Christianity to Sanamahism. Many fled. The kind of extortion happening across Manipur, in both hills and valley, is crazy. All communities are affected, but reportage is missing because of the fear these groups have created. Whatever narrative exists about ST status or community benefits has come from a certain kind of manipulation—that’s been my observation.

Talking about the Centre’s attitude, we must take note that after one year and seven months, the Prime Minister has not visited Manipur once. This is being felt quite acutely not just by the tribal population but also by the Meitei community—this feeling of being neglected. Does this not further feed the secessionist forces, this kind of attitude ?

Sure it does. There’s already an attitude people have about state intervention. The response to this violence has been delayed—that’s a criticism coming from different groups. But it also hasn’t been well thought out, nothing beyond gimmicks or just saying “we sent extra forces” or “there are peace initiatives.” An actual attempt to address this hasn’t happened. That’s also because BJP is in both Delhi and Imphal. They want to protect their own for whatever reason. They don’t want to show BJP has failed in Manipur because after their sweep in the Northeast, they want to show they know what they’re doing, though they clearly don’t. They want to pretend that despite the violence, they can continue to control Manipur because there are different policies they want to implement, all associated with Myanmar, certain projects they’re developing based on the Look East Policy.

They want to control the region but don’t want to address this violence because controlling that region means operating with people from all communities. They’re playing it so they don’t lose favor with any communities, but they’re also not distancing themselves from someone who has created and strengthened this rift in ways we see almost every month. Their approach seems acceptable because civil society in the rest of India has not responded adequately. The opposition tried to use Manipur as a talking point during the election, but beyond that, what has civil society really done ? How are we addressing this consistently ? Civil society groups, organizations, media agencies—there’s a lot of talk about Gaza, for good reason, but even those civil society groups that mobilized around that weren’t that active about Manipur before the war in Gaza started in October.

Even now, there’s a certain way the violence in Manipur is addressed—there’s this assumption that it’s too complicated, there are too many groups, or nothing can be done. Civil society groups seem to think “we can’t figure it out, so we won’t talk about it.” I agree we’re at a juncture where regardless of what we do, the Central government will have its way in taking forward its partisan, communal, casteist behavior. But where is the conversation about what’s happening in Manipur ? If not for that viral video, I can assure you the coverage Manipur has gotten wouldn’t have been even 10 per cent of what it is. There are so many more cases, apart from the viral video that requires attention. There are so many other instances from the initial days that I was trying to report in June that people weren’t interested in. It’s only certain kinds of voyeuristic gore that pushes people to pick it up, and that also disappears.

The Central government has been ineffective because opposition parties and civil society have been completely inadequate. Talking about it occasionally doesn’t help—unless you’re constantly making this a point of intervention, regularly discussing this, it’s not going to put any pressure on the Central government. Look at the farmers’ protest—the instances are completely different, and those were very powerful groups, but there was a certain design in which those protests happened. That kind of mobilization may not happen in this part, but what about the rest of India if it’s not happening in Manipur ?

This has been the question plaguing me more than anything else—there are so many bureaucrats in different parts of Manipur. What were they doing when this violence happened ? Why hasn’t any commission looked into their role ? Were they quiet ? Did they follow instructions to stay quiet ? When will they be questioned about what they saw and didn’t report ? What about journalists who didn’t report for months, for weeks, and let this fester ? All these questions come to mind. The lack of accountability that has remained for all these different players has allowed the State government and Central government to be completely unaccountable. If they’re doing this, it’s because different others have also let them take on that weapon and veil of being unaccountable.

Can you talk about the peace-building process, the initiatives—what needs to be done right now ? Because as you pointed out, there are Kuki MLAs in the BJP. So why is it not possible for the State government to bring the two communities to the table ?

The State government is not going to. They’ve been saying they’re having peace talks or conversations, but that’s a lie. Even something they orchestrated in Jiribam was blatantly false—it did not happen. Literally when the CM announced in the assembly that this was happening, there was violence occurring there. That day, I was in an area where Meitei women were all packing up and leaving, saying they would be attacked by Kukis anytime.

If everybody is looking at peace as a gimmick—if the CM is using the word “peace” as a gimmick to stay in power, which has become clear by now—then the answer is obvious. From the Kuki side, they’re saying unless the CM goes, they won’t negotiate or come to the table. From the Meitei side, they’re saying unless the Suspension of Operations agreement is removed and all the insurgents are declared banned groups, they won’t come to the negotiating table. But if these groups are deciding this, then what is the MHA deciding ? The MHA is still saying people on both sides are provoking violence, so we are looking at it, we are sending more forces. If this is a unique situation according to them, unprecedented in their tenure of governance, then it has to be dealt with accordingly.

There’s the Naga Member of Parliament (MP) from the outer constituency, MP Alfred. When he was being told to take a position, he said, “Bring my community as a negotiating community. Use us to bring both parties together.” Though at that point the insurgent group of the Nagas, NSCN (I-M), was turning against the Kukis, he said he would ensure a peace initiative would happen. He told the governor and mentioned this in Parliament—”Make us the peace-makers. Use us however required. Let senior leaders be given this option.” As a person from the opposition party and from the third community, the Nagas, he said this, but nobody took him seriously.

The Nagas are being pushed to take a stand on either side. But who is the stakeholder when it comes to state institutions ? Who holds power ? The state eventually decides what can and will be done. While so many people remain displaced and continue to suffer in relief camps, there’s only so much attention being given to victims of the violence on either side—people who have lost their homes, people who have lost family. The biggest worry for me is looking at young people of Manipur. On the tribal side, many are first-generation graduates, some second-generation, who are now able to consider UPSC not just as their only option but as a way to come back and serve society, to change their districts.

There are people who have been able to go to college while working by themselves—first-generation teachers, first-generation graduates who have now either taken up weapons or are in relief camps, which means they’ve been set back by years. That’s on all sides. Even if the affected people number 2-3 lakhs, with displaced people around 70-80,000, apart from those in camps and outside—even if the numbers aren’t big enough for India to take notice, it is significant. The fact that these many young people are either picking up arms or losing confidence in the government and saying weapons are their only way forward isn’t just troubling—it’s horrifying. That these people are being affected this way, and their voices aren’t being centred to create urgency for government action, is the biggest issue.