CETRI
Modern states strive for internal sovereignty, that is, to be the sole authority within a territory capable of making and enforcing laws, policies thereby monopolizing “the legitimate use of physical force”. By this criterion. Ethiopia mostly survived less on internal legitimacy and more on foolhardy international recognition. Ethiopia greatly benefitted from the intra-European conflict prior to and during WWII.
During the Cold War, the United States had a military base in Asmara, Eritrea, courtesy of Haile Selassie, in gratitude for U.S. help in the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia after WWII. Ethiopia sent troops to the Korean War [1] cleverly situating itself within the Western alliance.
After the mid-seventies, the former Soviet Union replaced the United States as an ally to the military dictator Mengistu Hailemariam who unleashed the Red Terror and horrendous crimes in Eritrea [2]. They invested heavily on finishing off the Eritrean struggle for self-determination and independence. Soviet generals, military advisors and South Yemen pilots were involved during many critical battles. Over 10, 000 Cuban troops were brought for the 1977 war against Somalia, thus freeing troops for the “Eritrean campaign”.
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- Meles Zenawi. President of Ethiopia from 1991 to 1995, 2nd Prime Minister from 1995 to his death in 2012. From 1989, he was the chairman of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
The EPLF triumphed against all odds and there were high hopes ! Independence was achieved at an enormous price, but sadly the country ended up under a reign of terror from a homegrown dictator. Independence has not ushered in more political rights and civil liberties ; if anything it brought an unprecedented level of repression and a country without a pretense of constitution. The nightmare for Eritreans still continues.
The late Meles Zenawi became a formidable player at the world stage, admired by Tony Blair and even by professor, former World Bank Chief economist and Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz. He situated himself as an “ally on the war on terror” while running a “developmentalist” state in close relationship with China. Meles was probably the most successful sub-Saharan African leader in terms of playing China and the West against each other. He was also very effective in isolating Eritrea, even while clearly violating an international verdict and preventing a closure for the border dispute. In this, he was also greatly assisted by the clumsy PFDJ who are erratic and prone to fall into the traps that TPLF prepared for them. Meles Zenawi humiliated Isaias Afeworki. Isaias has never forgiven the TPLF or Meles for this “disrespect”. As a result of the ensuing “no war no peace” situation, the Eritrean youth are in indefinite military service. Some have aged in the frontlines. Eritrea today is most known for producing refugees, with a significant percentage of those drowning while trying to cross the Mediterranean on makeshift boats.
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- Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of Ethiopia since 2018
It is over two years since the TPLF had been evicted from Addis Ababa, but the TPLF remains defiant and has called Abiy illegitimate, as of October 2020, while calling for the federal army to defend “constitutional politics” and constrain or overthrow Abiy. The country exists more or less on paper, with Tigray functioning like a quasi-state and with the entire country threatening to blow up wide open. Abiy promised to be a transitional agent until elections were to be held in August of 2020. There are clear signs that Abiy wants to extend his rule.
Abiy’s desire to be more than “transitional” is clearly signaled by his arrest of rivals and his confrontational posture towards the TPLF. It is a dangerous development that can engulf the entire Horn of Africa into war, with a potential to produce refugees that will dwarf any current refugee numbers from the region.
The Role of the Military
It appears that the role of the military will critically shape Ethiopia’s future. African military history and ethnic politics do reveal practices of ethnic manipulation within security institutions which have driven coup attempts. When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers. Leon Trotsky wrote in History of the Russian Revolution (1930) :
« There is no doubt that the fate of every revolution at a certain point is decided by a break in the disposition of the army. Thus in the streets and squares, by the bridges, at the barrack gates, is waged a ceaseless struggle – now dramatic, now unnoticeable – but always a desperate struggle, for the heart of the soldier. »
Even when authoritarian leaders might seem solitary, dictators never rule alone. When enforcers evade orders or rebel, the regime collapses. When they stay loyal, the regime stands. Mass protests alone are never enough.
Does Abiy have the loyalty of the federal army, which is composed of all ethnicities and originally built and organized under TPLF dominance ? How much purging and reorganization has he done within the last two years ? Was the assassination of General Searre Makonnen perhaps a factor in this ? I don’t know the answer to these questions, but answers do have significant relevance in any military calculations. To be sure, it is hard to imagine a military solution for the various challenges facing Ethiopia.
There is widespread suspicion that Searre was out of favor from both the TPLF and Abiy for their own reasons. General Searre’s wife, who was the only witness to the assassination by the “bodyguard”, was never officially interviewed. However, in an interview she gave to the BBC and local media, she said, her calls to the Prime Minister go unanswered. No one from the circles of power had reached out to her. With deep passion and emotion, she clearly recounts a series of eye-witness recollections and suspects a cover up, while clearly still grieving. She was in the middle of it all. It appears she only survived because the assassin was temporarily out of bullets.
Why is a witness of such significance excluded from the legal process ? What is the connection between the violence in Bahir Dar dubbed a “coup attempt” by Abiy Ahmed and the assassinations of Seare Makonnen and General Gezae Aberra ? Many unexplained questions surrounding this event are fueling many conspiracy theories. The reluctance of the Abiy government to reach out to Colonel Tsige, who is the widow of General Searre Makonnen, adds doubts. Who wanted Searre Makonnen out of the picture is the still-unanswered question. And Why ? Was this really a coup attempt from Bahir Dar ?
Was there a coordination between those responsible for the ‘coup’ in Bahir Dar and General Searre’s bodyguard turned his assassin ? If there is nothing to hide, why all the secrecy ? Something doesn’t add up in this story, but I can’t pin it down.
Abiy has trained thousands of special forces loyal to him mainly from the Oromo region where he is experiencing serious discontent and unrest. He calls them the Republican Guards and showed them off in a parade during the opening ceremony of a park in Addis Ababa. Earlier, there was a military parade in Tigray showing off preparedness for war, if necessary. We also know that Abiy has been actively shopping for weapons.
But there are also indications that Abiy may not be all that confident in his reorganized federal army. Recent defections of three Tigrean generals and the blocking of an Abiy appointee by the TPLF for the northern command point to a fractured army. It takes a serious stretch to truly call it a national army.
On the other hand, Ethiopia’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Head of operation affairs General Berhanu Julla says :
We will be compelled to take action against any entity that is seeking to impose its will in a way that violates the constitution,” He said that those who say that there is no government after September 30 should be careful not to violate the constitution. The defense force will stand in the guard of the constitution.
The TPLF posture is “Bring it on”. We are ready. The TPLF has since pulled some 40 Tigrean parliamentarians and political appointees, and Abiy has responded by cutting off the TPLF from the federal budget while claiming it will help lower level government institutions like the Woreda and Kebele (low level administrative units). It remains unclear how Abiy plans to reach lower level institutions in Tigray. Tigray is firmly controlled by the TPLF. The TPLF has declared that Abiy’s action is a “declaration of war”.
The situation has changed for the worse since the elections in Tigray and since my assessment of the situation in late August. The TPLF has amassed all kinds of arsenals in Tigray during the 27 years that it dominated Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the killings and military insurgency in Western Wolega and Benishangul-Gumuz show no sign of abating. Every day, there are killings and attacks by insurgents in various parts of Ethiopia. Beni Shangul Gumuz is the sight of violence and struggle. The Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonen, who is close to Abiy from the Amhara region, is calling for civilians to arm themselves in a clear admission that the Federal Army is not up to the task.
Abiy has recently stated that some of these insurgents are trained in Sudan crossing borders to attack. He was not explicit as to who is arming them or if there is a foreign government behind these attacks.
Abiy has pledged to hold elections within a year. He used the Health Minister Dr. Lia Tadesse to announce that it is now OK to hold elections with proper precautions. That a health minister is used to achieve a political goal is another indication of the extent of arm-twisting occurring under Abiy Ahmed.
But with the real contenders locked up under contrived charges and countrywide breakdown in law and order, very few feel a credible election can take place.
What will Abiy do ?
Is a military solution an option in light of the heavily armed and experienced TPLF ? Again, it is not clear that Abiy has confidence in his reorganized army. In a recent interview, he mentioned that there were elements sabotaging his PP regime. He went on between claiming that he was being patient and choosing “soft power” and claiming that there are those who are not carrying out their responsibilities and some who are working against him because they feel their interests have been affected.
Meanwhile, the TPLF is moving to drive a wedge between Abiy’s regime and the rest of Ethiopia. By singling out Abiy, the Parliament and the House of Federation, the TPLF is saying we’re loyal to Ethiopia, we care about its institutions, the constitution, defense forces and federalism, but we have a rogue regime in Addis Ababa. They’re trying to set the agenda, show that they’re formidable players, after having been cornered and relegated to Tigray for over two years. In Tigray, they have reorganized themselves, strengthening the Special Forces. Months and in some cases years before the Lemma group coup, which propelled Abiy into power after outmaneuvering the TPLF, Tigreans were persecuted in Ethiopia, as indicated in my reflections from 2017.
Times have changed since then, with new alliances and shifting loyalties, but there is no change as far as the deep ethnic and socioeconomic divisions are concerned. It is an illusion for Abiy to think that he can isolate the TPLF from the people of Tigray. Even for Tigreans who don’t like the TPLF, the campaign against Tigrinna speaking people in Ethiopia and the diaspora media has revived Tigrean nationalism, and the TPLF for better or worse is a symbol of that.
Of the 40 people that the TPLF recalled back, so far only one has rebuffed them. We still don’t know Dr. Arkebe Okbay’s’ status. Arkebe maybe the key person to watch for any compromise politics in Ethiopia. He is economic development oriented who has a proven record of credible efforts to improve the economy of Ethiopians when he was the mayor of Addis Ababa. To my knowledge, he is still one of the few TPLF politicians in a relatively civil relationship with Abiy.
But the TPLF is also keeping open its option to secede by invoking Article 39 of the constitution. They’re sending signals to Ethiopian opposition forces loyal to « federalism » like Jawar, Daud Ibbsa and the defense forces, etc. Daud Ibbsa, who is a long-time OLF leader (now under house arrest), is also calling for a transitional government within Oromia. Some of his rivals within the OLF are not going along. The Oromo elite is showing fragmentation.
The TPLF is pleading with the defense forces to rebel against Abiy. Suddenly, it has become an advocate for ‘a care taker transitional government’, which is what Jawar Mohammed, Daud Ibbsa and their nemesis Eskinder Nega are demanding. There is an overlap here of methodology, if not goals. Abiy is shying away from this talk of ‘care-taker government’ in favor of “national dialogue”. Abiy does not want to share power and sees danger in the notion of ‘care-taker government’. He seems determined to prolong his days in power. Hence he decided to take the world preoccupation with November 3rd and the American elections to take a military action against the TPLF.
Recalling the parliamentarians and government appointees served the TPLF by cutting off Abiy from anything in Tigray, while trying to woo the army, judiciary and other institutions. TPLF may be entertaining the prospect of playing in the center by positioning itself with new-found Oromo allies and other disgruntled Ethiopians. Tigreans (Tegaru) believe that they are the true original Ethiopians by virtue of being located at the heart of the Axumite civilization, which also once extended to the Eritrean highlands. The TPLF it once again appears to be positioning itself for a greater Tigray/Ethiopia on the ruins of a crumbling Ethiopia, with peripheries and competing war lords !
What is the End Game for the TPLF ?
The TPLF has never been clear about where Tigray begins and ends on a map, which is one reason I believe it has been reluctant to demarcate the border with Eritrea. There are different versions of Tigray in various maps produced at different times and depending on the political context.
Christopher Clapham in his book Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (1988) has something to say about the shifting goals of the TPLF, the then-rebel movement.
The Tigrean movement does not have the same level of internal division, because of the greater ethnic coherence of the area which it claims, though it is not entirely free of the endemic factionalism of Tigrean politics. At the same time, it is obliged to base its claims on the established administrative boundaries, rather than on any idea of a historic Tigrean nation, because any such ethnic appeal would entail inclusion of the Tigrinya-speaking people of Eritrea, and thus lock it into an irreconcilable conflict with the much more powerful Eritrean movement, to which it has historically been subordinate ; it would also deny it the large area of Tigray region which is inhabited by non-Tigrinya speakers. This in turn creates a ’national problem’ within Tigray itself, due to the presence of minority groups such as the Afars and Saho which the TPLF seeks to incorporate into a Tigray nation — a local example of an inherent problem which has afflicted African secessionist movements from Biafra onwards. The uneasy relationship with Eritrea likewise underlies another problem for the TPLF, derived from the fact that the Tigray region has no external boundaries, either to the Red Sea or to the Sudan, but is entirely surrounded by the other regions of Ethiopia. At a practical level, this means that the EPLF acquiescence is required to move people and material through Eritrea to Tigray, and intensifies TPLF dependence on its northern counterpart. More generally, the TPLF needs to define Tigray in such a way as to gain external access, and the two geographically most appropriate ways of doing so, by claiming a corridor to the Red sea at Tiyo or Merse Fatma on the one hand, or to the Sudan between the Gash and Setit rivers on the other, are both closed off because they form part of Eritrea. The TPLF has therefore instead claimed part of northern Gonder, asserting entirely fictitiously that for a couple of years in the early 1940’s this was administered as part of Tigray. It has claimed Wag in northern Wollo on the same ground (p. 211).
This assessment is from 1988. Times have of course changed.
Isaias Vs. TPLF Now
Eritrea is weak and depopulated known for producing refugees in the world stage while Mekelle is in a much better situation. Most Eritreans feel hurt by Isaias and his PFDJ in a profound sense of betrayal. Eritrea’s trademark is to serve as a poster child for everything that can possibly go wrong. After one of the bitterest revolutions, it was one of the hopeful and idealistic movements of the 20th century.
Dreams for Eritrea became disillusionments soon after independence and especially after the (1998-2000) war with Ethiopia, by many accounts, a totally unnecessary war. This so-called border war and its diplomatic effects became debilitating for Eritrea. According to Eritrean Colonel Amine Abraha, who was an Eritrean freedom fighter with the EPLF and later participated in the “border war” as a battalion commander, Eritrea was ill-prepared for the border war both equipment-wise and in terms of morale. Add to this weapons that were inherited from the war against the Dergue were aged and missing spare parts. The Eritrean Defense Forces resented their corrupt commanders. The relationship of the soldiers and commanders was one of distrust. Under these circumstances, Colonel Amina Abraha believed that Eritrea would not succeed. He paints a very different picture of the EPLF than the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). In the aftermath, diplomatically, Eritrea was reduced to a pariah state for twenty years.
The so-called peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia under Abiy is of considerable personal benefit to Isaias but there is little to show for Eritrea as a nation. Abiy signed a peace agreement with Eritrea which he had no power to implement without TPLF cooperation. Eritreans were told by Isaias that the impasse for 20 years was because the TPLF refused to demarcate the border based on The Hague verdict, but when he realized that Abiy has turned against the TPLF, he suddenly declared “borders do not really matter”. There is hardly any emphasis on demarcation under this so- called peace for which Abiy won the Nobel Prize. It remains a deal between two people shrouded in secrecy. There are ample indications that Isaias may be compromising Eritrean sovereignty through secret deals with Abiy. It would not be the first time for Isaias to betray Eritrea. He once collaborated with the TPLF against the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) driving it out of Eritrea.
For Isaias Afeworki everything is personal, at the expense of the long suffering Eritreans. While the personal relationship between Abiy and Isaias seems deep because of a symbiotic need for survival, in contrast, the Eritrean Tigrean border, after a brief opening, is a scene of military face-off. Abiy in his most recent visit to Eritrea was photographed with Isaias while viewing the main military training camp in Eritrea known as Sawa. Isaias visited Jimma and the Air Force in Ethiopia from October 12-14, where the fraternization with Abiy was obvious.
Abiy was an intelligence chief of INSA for the TPLF/EPRDF but is now firmly in alliance with Isaias Afeworki against the TPLF. INSA is omnipresent in the lives of dissidents who make phone calls, send emails or make financial transactions, according to testimony by an Tigrean engineer who worked under Abiy at INSA. Human Rights Watch has documented this wide-spread surveillance, citing inside sources, under the title “they know everything we do”.
Eritrea as Catharsis for Ethiopia
Internal political dynamics in Ethiopia had historically sought catharsis by scapegoating Eritrea. Ethiopian nationalism needs Eritrea to maintain a semblance of coherence. Leaving Eritrea and Eritreans alone puts Ethiopia in a state of collective identity crisis. Hostility, war and rituals of violence against Eritreans have given Ethiopians a form of domestic ideological coherence while allowing the inherent tensions of Ethiopian society to be temporarily dispelled. For example, Badme was offered as a cathartic moment for the TPLF to assert its Ethiopianism, at a time that Ethiopians were skeptical of its intentions. The TPLF was able to mobilize even Dergue generals and cadres who were resentful and angry that Eritrea became an independent state. It worked for the TPLF, enabling it to consolidate within Ethiopia. And now Abiy needs Eritreans against the TPLF to maintain his rule against threats from the TPLF and even from Oromos who do not see him as Oromo enough. There is no benefit for Eritreans to be involved in the complex Ethiopian politics except to die for a conflict and be a subject of scapegoating and an easy target as a foreign enemy. The President of Tigray, Dr. Debretsion GebreMichael is accusing Abiy of treason for collaborating with Isaias to attack Tigray. Eritrea needs to focus within and try to normalize life for Eritreans who have not known normal life for over seventy years.
In an Op-ed issue of the NY Times, Nicholas Kristof mentioned in passing that Eritrea is at the bottom measured by every development index :
The [Progress Social] index…research of Nobel-winning economists, collects 50 metrics of well-being — nutrition, safety, freedom, the environment, health, education and more — to measure quality of life. Norway comes out on top in the 2020 edition, followed by Denmark, Finland and New Zealand. South Sudan is at the bottom, with Chad, Central African Republic and Eritrea just behind.
Meanwhile, the TPLF media, Ethnic Oromo entrepreneurs, and Amhara media are interjecting Eritrea into an effort to unite. The situation in Ethiopia is not about Eritrea, (at least, it should not be) ; it is about a moment of truth for the future of Ethiopia as a state. And Isaias Afeworki for his own reasons of bitter rivalry with the TPLF is more than willing to involve Eritreans in internal Ethiopian affairs. He wants to sacrifice Eritreans and Eritrea on behalf of Abiy, which explains Abiy’s bravado. Eritreans should make loudest noise about staying away from Ethiopian affairs. Plunging into this abyss is going where no one can probably get out of. It is also worrisome that Eritreans cannot be certain about what the TPLF wants from Eritrea. The TPLF has been shifting the goal post for twenty years on peace with Eritrea in an attempt to strangle Eritrea. For this reason, many Eritreans believe that TPLF’s target is not only Isaias but also the idea of Eritrea. Isaias’s highly visible close relationship with Abiy provides the TPLF with a mobilization tool to create anti Eritrean sentiment.
Eritrea has been under the grip of one man for decades. It is difficult to predict what will happen in Eritrea when the dictatorship ends, the most dangerous time for countries under dictatorships. Dictatorships never allow for alternative institutions and structures to develop. In Eritrea, nothing is allowed outside the permission of the PFDJ and Isaias Afeworki.
There are also clear indications that Isaias is telling Abiy that he has his back against the TPLF to try to sacrifice Eritreans in a war they should stay away from. There is no reason for Eritreans to be involved in this mess and it is truly a mess from which Ethiopia may not even recover as one entity. This is about two people : Abiy and Isaias to prolong their days in power.
Abiy Ahmed has done a favor for Isaias by helping him come out of the cold. He was severely cornered both regionally and internationally. Qatar was his only significant lifeline at one point. For its part, the TPLF has consistently accused Abiy of treason for his relationship with Isaias, which, again, is shrouded in secrecy : hence, my fear that Eritreans are once again being prepared to become sacrificial lambs in the intra-Ethiopian quagmire from which Eritreans have nothing to gain and possibly everything to lose. Eritreans need to demarcate the border according to the international verdict and hope for good neighborliness with an Ethiopia reconciled with itself. Isaias is about Isaias, for whom Eritrean lives mean absolutely nothing.
The Way Forward
A new paradigm and an organizing principle that puts peoples rather than elite preferences in the forefront. The nationalism, in Ethiopia which often manifests itself as ethno-nationalism, is rendering politics unsustainably complex. The Ethno-nationalisms fragment into sub-ethno-nationalisms.
It should be clear that the way forward is not to mindlessly repeat mantras about dialogue aimed at shoring up a PP that seems incapable of governing. Rather, what is needed is clarity and the political courage to squarely face the facts on the ground. The Horn of Africa desperately needs security and stability, but this will not be achieved by propping up inherently destabilizing regimes.
It seems a loose confederation for Ethiopia might be a feasible way forward to return to anything resembling normalcy. This is as much true for Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, etc. It takes a long time to prepare the conditions for elections with a neutral election board and state-wide institutions as well as neutral interest group politics. Ethiopia appears on the brink of something scary unless the political and ethnic turmoil that has been building can somehow be channeled to get out of the vicious cycle in which the parties have entrapped themselves.
Civil war is what needs to be prevented in Ethiopia at any cost, and this may require active intervention from other countries with financial and political leverage over Abiy. And time is very much of the essence. The conditions for confrontations are growing by the day, with mutual continuous recriminations, and political and personal insults. The other problem with these elites competing in a dangerous power game is that they know each other quite well. Most of them once worked for the EPRDF or as opposition figures. While they all talk about the constitution being violated by one party or another, in reality they have all violated it.
In the short term, seizing the possibilities presented by proto-states maybe the only realistic hope of salvaging a modicum of regional stability and international security from otherwise intractable situations. Over the long term, these incremental developments, firmly rooted in organic realities, can yield legitimacy. And that not only provides an anchor for some order amid volatile conditions but also opens the way for a more flexible and pluralistic world.
