CETRI
Introduction
The nation-wide protests in Nicaragua of 2018 and its subsequent lethal repression by the government costed the life to at least 322 people (Amnesty International, 2018) and have led to the establishment of a quasi-police state at the hand of president Daniel Ortega and his party, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). As I could witness during my stay in the country at that time, what started as a spontaneous popular insurrection has crystallized into a game of classic liberal politics, excluding most of the Nicaraguan population within the process.
In this essay, I will demonstrate how Nicaraguan economic and political elites have co-opted this popular insurrection and eliminated its radical elements to the advantage of their own interests and agenda. Because of the elimination of the radical flanks, the diversity of tactics has significantly been diminished, both in scope and aim. The results of co-optation are not only at the expense of the interests of the general population but also aided the Ortega regime to maintain its power. All things considered, the economic and political elites, represented in a recently established political platform named the ‘National Coalition’, are not the allies the people of Nicaragua need, nor they deserve. Through this case, I want to demonstrate that the theory of ‘Radical Flank Effects’ is elitist and wrongly assumes that only the radical flanks could harm a broader movement.
Co-Optation, Radical Flank Theory, and Diversity of Tactics
Popular insurrections with broad support among the population, are often very heterogeneous because of their size. Although much of these mass-based uprisings are grassroots and spontaneous, diverse established political and social groups will try to put on their bandwagon, seeking to curb the mobilization to the advantage of their interests. However, when certain groups go further than just taking advantage, and try to control the whole movement, we can start speaking about ‘co-optation’. According to Baur and Schmitz (2012), co-optation is a form of institutionalizing social protest that is engineered by more powerful groups to demobilize the opposition and ensure that their demands are watered down. This process of institutionalization through co-optation also implies that movements give up more disruptive forms of activism (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998) and that opposition is incorporated into the legitimate structure of the negotiating process (Murphree, Wright, & Ebaugh, 1996). Co-optation is not only a strategy that can be employed by social, political, or governmental actors, but also by economic interests. It is a strategy in which a corporation has the ability to align the interests of a challenging group with its own goals (Trumpy, 2008).
As co-optation leads to watered-down demands, it can be stated that they likewise attempt to temper or eliminate radical elements within a broader movement. After all, it is often reasoned that activities of radicals in a social movement can undermine the position of moderates by discrediting movement activities and goals. Haines (1984) has called this general backlash a ‘negative radical flank effect’. Conversely, he states, a ‘positive radical flank effect’ can occur when the bargaining position of moderates is strengthened by the presence of more radical groups. This happens when the latter makes the former seem as ‘reasonable’ or when radicals create crises that are resolved to the moderates’ advantage. Thus, the ‘radical flank effect’ refers to the positive or negative effects that radicals have on more moderate activists or advocates for the same cause. According to Haines, radical groups might, for example, increase or decrease the level of public awareness of moderate groups. They might alter public definitions of moderates as more or less « extreme, » « reasonable, » or « dangerous. » Radicals might increase or decrease moderates’ access to decisionmakers. And, finally, radical flank effects might influence the capacity of moderate groups to attract resources from supporters who are not members of the moderate groups themselves.
As co-optation could temper or eliminate more radical elements within a broader movement, used tactics and strategies also become more limited in diversity and scope. Institutionalization of a movement insurmountably leads to less autonomy for local groups within that movement. Consequently, this has a negative impact on the ‘diversity of tactics’. The debate over the ‘diversity of tactics’ arose in the wake of the Battle of Seattle in 1999 and revolved around the acceptability of more disruptive or confrontational forms of direct action (Conway, 2003). From this debate, the ethic ‘respect for tactical diversity’ arose, which addresses the valorization of political autonomy while stressing the legitimate heterogeneity of forms of protests within a single movement (Dupuis-Déri, 2010). In sum, an ethic of ‘diversity of tactics’ assumes that not everyone wants to deploy the same protest tactic, but that each one is respected and should have the capacity to be carried out, to the advantage of the broader movement.
Nicaragua : From Autoconvocados to the National Coalition
The initial protest movement of 2018 in Nicaragua arose from the convergence of two intertwined mobilization phases. The first phase took place in the first weeks of April 2018, as a response to the lack of initiative by the government to address adequately a forest fire in ‘Indio Maíz’, one of the biggest and most biodiverse tropical forests in Nicaragua. The second mobilization occurred a week later, as a response to the announced reforms in the social security system, which meant higher contributions from employers and employees and reductions in pensions. The second mobilization was met with a lot of violence committed by pro-government mobs, while the police just stood by and watched this happen. It is because of this one-sided violence that students in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, decided to occupy their universities the next day as a response to repressive means the Ortega regime. By April 20, protests expanded to other cities all over Nicaragua. At this point, protesting was not so much about social security or environmental issues, but against authoritarianism, the atrocities the Ortega government had committed since 2006 – especially police brutality, and the fact that a lot of students were being murdered by the police (“It’s No Longer About Social Security,” 2018). The demand was the immediate exit of the Ortega regime.
Over the next weeks, most clashes between pro-government groups (police, mobs, and paramilitary groups) and oppositional groups (students, activists, and also paramilitary groups) would take place in and around universities and local ‘barrios’ (poorer neighborhoods), such as Monimbo in the city Masaya. The popular protest movement was characterized by its organization through local bottom-up affinity groups, in a horizontal and non-hierarchical manner (“It’s No Longer About Social Security,” 2018). At that time, students denounced any attempt to co-opt the entire movement by the private sector, the upper class, or right-wing movements. These affinity groups called themselves ‘autoconvocados’, or ‘self-assembled’ or ‘self-organized’, thus identifying themselves as autonomous without ties to established organizations or movements. The autoconvocado-logic spread all over the popular movement, establishing networks of mutual aid to the benefit of the demonstrators in the universities, the roadblocks, the barrios, the marches, and so on. People were handing out supplies, water, clothes, or food to support each other. Because of this diffuse, leaderless, and bottom-up organizational structure, the Ortega regime lacked the resources and experience to address the insurrection. The regime was cornered, especially by the demand for the immediate resignation of Ortega as president. The latter, then, saw no alternative but to criminalize the entire movement (calling them ‘terrorist’ or ‘right-wing putschists’) in combination with lethal repression, both by police and paramilitary groups.
As a result, despite the enormous popular mobilization, the government managed to regain a grip on the situation and in the streets. By July, the police and pro-government paramilitary groups started offensive ‘Operación Limpieza’ (Cleaning Operation), destroying every last hub of resistance in Nicaragua. Since then, Ortega has established a quasi-police state, outlawing any form of public protest. On the rare occasion a few people dare to gather together to express their discontent or grievances, a multitude of police units arrive to break the group apart.
Although the student movements initially renounced them, established political and economic organizations would try and take advantage of the momentum created by the popular insurrection, eventually leading to the co-optation of the entire movement. On February 25, 2020, almost two years later, the ‘National Coalition’ was founded, a joint movement of seven oppositional political organizations. The platform aims to force the Ortega regime to restore democratic freedoms, free all political prisoners, and achieve an electoral reform that leads to free and transparent elections (Aburto, 2020c).
With the foundation of this ‘National Coalition’, the institutionalization of the initial insurrection movement had been completed. Contrary to the ‘autoconvocado-logic’ from before, the ‘National Coalition’ is top-down, vertical, and hierarchical organized. And whereas the initial insurrection was carried out by mass popular participation, the National Coalition has mainly become an instrument of the economic and political elite and their interests. As a result, a lot of students have left the coalition because they feel that the youth has been displaced and that each sector just wants to represent their own interests (Aburto, 2020a). Belgian-Nicaraguan student leader, Amaya Coppens, has stated that the feminist and environmental agenda has been relegated as well and that the struggle against the Ortega regime has become more ‘bureaucratic’, in contrast to the initial social explosion in the streets (Aburto, 2020b).
Because of the co-optation of the insurrection by economic and political elites, the scope and aims of the demands have been watered-down as well. Students’ demands have been suppressed, shifting from full infrastructural or societal change to justice for the people who were murdered during the protests (“The April 19 Uprising in Nicaragua,” 2018). And while the initial dialogues with the government were backed by the demand for the resignation of the Ortega regime, the focus of the newly formed National Coalition shifted to the elections that are to be held in 2021. The goal thus shifted from the immediate exit of Ortega to getting him out of office through the ballot, thus recognizing his candidacy for the presidency despite the numerous human rights violations on his account. The macro strategy thus has been transformed into a pragmatic logic : ‘first Ortega will step down, then we figure out what kind of country we want to live in’ (“Update from Nicaragua,” 2019).
The National Coalition is Not Your Ally
The oppositional ‘National Coalition’ platform has thus become mainly an instrument of the political and economic elite in Nicaragua. However, by presenting themselves as a broad opposition against the Ortega regime, these elites try to hide the fact that they have been lucratively involved with the Ortega regime in the years before. Although it was the environmental and social protests that had led directly to the insurrection, the underlying cause was the decade-long establishment and extension of an oppressive ‘authoritative corporatist regime’, which was supported by these very elites. Already in 2001, five years before assuming power, Daniel Ortega made a pact with then-president Arnoldo Aléman of the right-wing Liberal Party (PLC). The pact changed the electoral law, allowing Ortega to win the presidency in 2006 (among other things), and in return, he pardoned Aléman from a 20-year prison sentence after tremendous corruption scandals during his presidency.
In the long run, the pact was a successful attempt by Ortega to eliminate third-party opposition, create less political freedoms for Nicaraguans, and rupture the balance of judicial power once he reclaimed the presidency (Navas, 2019 ; Rogers, 2009). Over the years, even some prominent figures of the PLC, such as Morales Carazo or Jose Antonio Alvarado, once strong opponents of Ortega’s Sandinista party, would join the FSLN and take up lucrative positions within the party or government, (Munguía, 2019).
Whilst not downplaying the role of Ortega in disrupting oppositional forces, the entire political class in Nicaragua needs to be held responsible for their inability to construct, or consolidate, a solid alternative capable of changing the correlation of internal forces (Belli, 2017). In Nicaragua, and other authoritative democracies, such as Russia (Dollbaum, 2017), opposition parties are to a high extend co-opted, in which they enjoy continued participation in the political institutions and the benefits that this status entails without seriously challenging the dominance of the central executive and the ruling party.
Furthermore, the Ortega regime has also made several pacts with the economic elite over the years. Through the representation of COSEP (the leading business chamber in Nicaragua), big business has been a permanent negotiating partner, whilst other groups, such as the middle class, self-employed professionals, employees, and consumers have been excluded from the negotiating table (Medal, 2012). In return for adopting a neoliberal economic policy, the economic elite remained often silent when the Ortega government made institutional changes that eroded Nicaraguan democracy, creating an authoritative corporatist regime (Chamorro, 2018).
Thus, over the years, Ortega managed to create a stable autocracy based upon three pillars : legitimation, repression, and co-optation of strategically relevant actors (Gerschewski, 2013). To put in other words, the political opposition and the economic elite have all been complicit to the creation of the authoritative regime of Ortega, and thus indirectly contributed to the means necessary to lethally repress the Nicaraguan population on mass-scale in 2018. It is, therefore, a bitter pill to take beholding that those elites are now in leading and prominent positions within the National Coalition, the platform made to oppose the regime they helped create.
Solo el Pueblo Salva al Pueblo
The co-optation of the popular insurrection of the economic and political elite has thus led to the transformation of a grassroots and heterogenous movement to a top-down and homogenous one that can easily be controlled. In an interview, José Adán Aguerri, president of COSEP, calls for unity in order to defeat Ortega through elections (Olivares, 2020). However, this call for unity translates itself in submerging the diversity in goals and strategies from different actors into one. This one strategy embraces classic liberal politics, in which these elites evidently have the higher ground. Taking into account their complicity in the establishment of the Ortega regime and their own interests, one should raise the question if these elites really strive to structural societal change or just reposition themselves pragmatically in order to defend their interests and agendas in the case a regime change would occur. Regarding their past, the latter option seems the most reasonable one and this explains why more radical voices are suppressed in the name of this ‘national unity’.
Nevertheless, it seems moderation of goals and strategy was more to the benefit of the Ortega regime itself than to the people of Nicaragua. After all, by focusing on mediation, dialogue, and change through the ballot, direct pressure from the protests in the streets diminished, allowing the government and police forces to reorganize and take control once again, creating a quasi-police state in Nicaragua ever since. Furthermore, it shows a great deal of naivety to believe that solely focusing time and energy on elections will effectively lead to a fundamental regime change. As former Nicaraguan vice president Sergio Ramirez affirms, fair and transparent elections in 2021 don’t exist in the country and there is basically no pressure on Ortega to change this, making it virtually impossible to deprive him of re-election (“Sergio Ramirez,” 2020).
By co-opting the popular insurrection through pragmatism, the economic and political elite managed to diminish or even eliminate its highly needed radical elements, paving the way to moderation, water-downed goals, and a single-issue tactic, namely (unfair and untransparent) elections. This ultimately resulted in a tighter grip on power by the Ortega regime, at the expense of the people who dared to confront this regime directly. The autoconvocado rallying cry was ‘solo el pueblo salva al pueblo’, ‘only the people can save the people’. As should be clear by now, the ‘National Coalition’ does not represent the people and it definitely cannot save them, at least not profoundly and substantially.
Instead, the autoconvocado-logic needs to be embraced again, in which the heterogeneity and autonomy of a broad popular movement are accepted, and the diversity of tactics is respected and considered as complementary. There are still radical voices in Nicaragua, and they should definitely be heard. The tactic of dialogue and rhetoric of a ‘peaceful way out’ should be rejected – or put into question at least, because only big capital can benefit from this negotiation. An unarmed rebellion is the only way forward, and can never be really ‘peaceful’ in the eyes of a government that will always attack its opposition (Martínez, 2019).
Eventually, it is up to the Nicaraguan people to decide how they will take matters at hand, and not to a handful of elitist representatives. It is up to those who offered the greatest sacrifices on the barricades, and not to those who watched from the safety of their gated community.
Conclusion
Through the case of the Nicaraguan popular insurrection of 2018, I have demonstrated how co-optation of a mass-based movement by the economic and political elite leads to the elimination of its most radical elements. As a result, this process has been at the expense of the diversity of tactics, which in turn benefits the dictatorial regime of Daniel Ortega. This case thus shows that it is not necessarily the radical elements that can make or break a movement, but that it can be the moderate elements as well. Therefore, the theory of ‘radical flank effects’ should be considered as elitist because it assumes that moderate elements within a movement are more legitimate and have moral authority over the more radical ones. I hope this case has shown that a broader theory of ‘Flank effects’ is more suitable because this acknowledges that radical and moderate elements within a movement are equally legitimate and that both can make or break a movement. In the case of Nicaragua, the moderation – and composition – of the National Coalition has been at the expense of the entire popular insurrection and its representatives should therefore not be considered as a true ally of the Nicaraguan people.
