For the past fifteen years, the BRICS have been asserting themselves on the global stage, shaking up geopolitical balances, and questioning the inequalities inherent in the postcolonial economic system dominated by the West. Working towards the construction of a multipolar world more consistent with their economic and demographic weight, they crystallize the aspirations of the global South to break free from an international order perceived as unjust, incapable of meeting its development needs and the major challenges facing humanity.
As the August 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg approached, the South African ambassador to the bloc summarized these aspirations as follows : “You have almost a system [akin to] apartheid South Africa where the minority decides for the majority, and that’s still the situation on the world stage today. We don’t want to be told what is right for us, we want the fault lines of the current global governance architecture to be redesigned, to be reformed, to be transformed […] we want to be part of the process to create a more equitable, a more inclusive, a multipolar global community […]”(Al Jazeera, August 22, 2023).
Gathering the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, along with nearly sixty other heads of state, mostly originating from the global South, this summit—the first in-person meeting since the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the invasion of Ukraine— were to be ambitious. Challenging the predominant role of the dollar in the international financial and monetary architecture and criticizing its use as a weapon by the United States, in a context marked by the freezing of Russia’s assets, the exclusion of its banks from the SWIFT network, and the ban on Russian oil imports, BRICS aspired to free « developing countries from submission to traditional financial institutions » (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) through the promotion of alternative payment methods based on national currencies, and the strengthening of its New Development Bank (NDB).
Under the theme « BRICS and Africa : Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism, » the bloc also aimed to strengthen its ties with the continent within the framework of South-South cooperation « on an equal footing », emphasizing equality, mutual benefit, and strict respect for sovereignty—core principles of the coalition since its inception. However, this meeting was primarily intended to formalize the entry of new members into the bloc. After zealous negotiations, the BRICS ultimately announced the expansion of the coalition to include six carefully selected new countries, with the clear objective of exerting greater influence on global balances : Iran, Argentina, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia.
From now on, the expanded BRICS (BRICS+) encompass nearly 3.6 billion people, accounting for 46.6% of the world’s population. Their economic weight (36% of global GDP at purchasing power parity) surpasses that of the G7 countries (around 30% of global GDP and 10% of the world’s population) and is expected to reach 50% of global wealth production by 2050 (compared to 20% for the G7 countries). They will be responsible for 38.3% of global industrial production, account for 25% of total global goods exports, and already represent nearly 40% of global infrastructure investments. They will also control 54% of global oil production, over 53% of natural gas reserves, 40% of coal reserves, and almost half of food production. Finally, they are expected to dominate the market for critical and strategic metals and minerals essential for energy transition and cutting-edge technologies (Ventura, 2023 ; Pröbsting, 2023).
While it has sparked a mixture of fears and sarcastic comments in Western media, the announcement of this rise in power has immediately stirred enthusiasm, both in the North and the South, among some left-wing intellectuals. Ramón Grosfoguel, one of the main figures of the decolonial movement, sees it as the inauguration of a true « multipolar alternative to the unipolar world dominated by the United States and their European allies, complicit in imperialism, » that of a « pluriversal » and « emancipatory » world parallel to it, finally respecting the « sovereignty » of peoples (TeleSur, August 23, 2023) ; Argentine Marxist sociologist Atilio Borón sees it as the advent of a « post-hegemonic world, » a « new international reality much more conducive to the development, industrialization, and improvement of living conditions in the global South » (TeleSur, August 24, 2023) ; and Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos sees it as the possibility of a « non-colonial capitalism, » an alternative « perhaps more radical than the alternative between socialism and capitalism » (2024). Alongside them, many (intellectuals, left-wing journalists, and activists) celebrate what they consider as a blow to imperialism, if not to Western capitalism (Robinson, 2015 ; 2023). And the beginning of a process of « de-Westernization » of the world.
Undoubtedly, the BRICS phenomenon symbolizes the shift of the economic centre of gravity from the North to the South. This « de-westernization » that many have been calling for is indeed underway. And it is primarily evident in economic statistics. As a sign of the progressive loss of influence of the ‘central’ countries, the multipolar world is already in some ways in gestation. This incremental change is notably evidenced in the growing refusal of Southern countries to align themselves with the North on major international issues and their common desire to end the hegemony of the dollar, against a backdrop of sharp international tensions (Ukraine, Palestine, etc.), reconfiguration of alliances, and growing rivalry between China and the United States.
Is the rise of the BRICS synonymous with an anti-imperialist, or even anti-capitalist, alternative to the international order and neoliberal hegemony ? Does it signal the end of an unjust neocolonial system, which generates exclusions and inequalities ? Does it foreshadow the emergence of more balanced relations between states and new forms of solidarity among developing countries ? Does it pave the way for other development models better equipped to address global injustices and North-South asymmetries ? In short, is it the beginning of a process of emancipation for a humanity hitherto marginalized ? Or does it simply reflect the members’ desire to reshuffle the cards in their favor without fundamentally changing the rules of the game ? Despite their progressive rhetoric, do the BRICS tend more towards reproducing, within their respective spheres of influence, the logics of domination and exploitation that characterize North-South relations ? These are the questions that this new issue of Alternatives Sud seeks to answer, continuing a reflection initiated over a decade ago on the new coalitions of Southern states, their significance, challenges, prospects, and limitations [1].
Resurgence of the Bandung spirit ?
Most activist interpretations of the BRICS phenomenon do not fail to establish a connection, if not parallels, between the bloc and other anti-colonial formations of Southern states, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, launched at the Bandung Conference (Indonesia) in 1955, the Group of 77 established in 1964 to represent what was then called the « Third World » in international forums, and the Movement for a New International Economic Order initiated in the 1970s.
After nearly three decades of being eclipsed, an absence associated with the global spread of the neoliberal model following the disintegration of the USSR, the « global South » (the most recent appellation for the previous one of « Third World ») is said to be making a comeback on the international stage. And the BRICS are considered the most recent and accomplished expression of this, in a way reviving the spirit of Bandung and the demand for a new international economic order. Summit after summit, the leaders of the alliance countries never fail to mention it, including in their joint statements. However, it is difficult to connect the BRICS+ to these previous « Third World » experiences considering their trajectory, the relationships they maintain among themselves, and the real interests that drive them.
Genesis and trajectory
First and foremost, it is worth recalling that the BRICS were not originally the result of a common and collective project. This alliance is in fact one of the few international entities to have been named before its institutional or organizational foundations were laid. Ironically, the creation of the BRICS was inspired from the outside by a major Western bank, Goldman Sachs.
One of its chief economists, Jim O’Neill, coined the acronym – at the time « BRIC » – in 2001, to refer to the four international markets (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) showing most promising growth and investment prospects, expected to exert a growing influence on the world’s economic landscape. It was only several years after the term was coined that an effective rapprochement between these three major powers occurred and crystallized in the form of an « institution » (Garcia, 2019 ; Garcia and Bond, 2019 ; Stuenkel, 2020).
In fact, the seed of this coalition can be traced back to the IBSA project, a coalition established in 2003 by India, Brazil, and South Africa, in response to the challenges posed by the restrictive application of intellectual property rights under the WTO framework. At the time, India was a major producer of generic drugs, with South Africa and Brazil being the main purchasers. Confronted with the pressure exerted by major pharmaceutical companies in the North, these countries sought to loosen these restrictive rights, seen as impeding their trade and obstructing their health policies.
Echoing the rhetoric of South-South cooperation, these countries also denounced global asymmetries in agricultural liberalization, questioned the predominant role of the G8 in global governance, emphasized respect for international law, and called for a thorough reform of the United Nations and international financial institutions (Bello, 2014 ; Garcia and Bond, 2019 ; Stuenkel, 2020). As the Brazilian Foreign Minister stated at the time, it was about “reorganizing the world in the direction that the overwhelming majority of mankind expects and needs" (quoted in Stuenkel, 2020).
Although the IBSA initiative did not gain the media visibility of the BRICS nor reach their level of institutionalization, it marked a decisive first step in the willingness of these « new giants » to seek common areas of cooperation and deepen their synergies. The convergence with Russia and China would come later. In 2006, the foreign ministers of India, Brazil, China, and Russia held their first informal meeting, aiming to create a collective dialogue space. However, it was only in 2007-2008 that a real turning point in their relations occurred, precipitated by the 2008 financial crisis. Originating from the West, this crisis, explains Oliver Stuenkel, « was a key element not only in strengthening the narrative of multipolarization, but also in transforming the BRICS into a political grouping that attempted to develop common positions in several areas, starting with global financial governance » (Ibid.).
Faced with the reverberation effect caused by the collapse of the financial system and the ensuing credit crisis, which would permanently discredit the dominant actors of global governance in the eyes of the global South, the four countries adopted a common set of demands. In exchange for their contribution to the rescue of the financial system, they claimed and obtained their place in the highly exclusive club of powers : the G20, more inclusive than the G8, will from now one be considered the primary space for dialogue and consultation on the international level. They also demand a more favourable reform of the quota system at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—a demand that will be granted to them at the expense of other Southern countries (Garcia and Bond, 2019).
Increasingly aware of their place and role in world affairs, after opening several discussion channels among themselves and holding several ad hoc meetings on the sidelines of major international gatherings, these four states eventually formalized their ‘convergence’ during their first summit held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. In the course of this international conference, the four members established objectives including seeking solutions to enhance the global economic situation, reforming financial institutions, and strengthening their bilateral relations, based on principles of non-interference, equality among partners, and mutual benefit. Following this first summit, they finally agreed on the need for a new international reserve currency, capable of counterbalancing the dollar, therefore stabilizing the global financial system (Stuenkel, 2020). In 2010, South Africa joined the group and would now serve as the spokesperson for the African continent within it.
Driven by a dynamic surge in trade among its members, the group then underwent a process of « institutional densification. » Between summits, which would now be held annually, numerous meetings were organized to discuss specific areas of cooperation. Also, spaces for dialogue between government agencies or national non-governmental entities were established, such as the BRICS Business Council, the Think Tank Council and Academic Forum, and the BRICS Civil Forum established in 2015 on the Moscow Initiative (sic). Remaining true to their past commitment, the members also decided to launch a reserve fund (Contingent Reserve Agreement, CRA) aimed at addressing their balance of payment issues.
Above all, they established a New Development Bank (NDB), that will finance infrastructure or energy projects within their territories and in other developing countries. Endowed with an initial capital of $50 billion, the New Development Bank of the BRICS will be presented as an alternative financing instrument to the World Bank (Garcia, 2019 ; Garcia and Bond, 2020 ; Bond, 2022) and will be celebrated by some enthusiastic commentators as a major turning point in the reconfiguration of the neoliberal economic order. In this regard, Radhika Desai wrote : “The BRICS countries [now] do have a mortar that binds them : their common experience, and rejection, of the neoliberal development model of the past several decades [...] They have long called for the reform of the IMF and the World Bank only to meet with resistance. Rather than waiting, they have decided to act […]. Not since the day of the Non-Aligned Movement and its demand for a New International Economic Order in the 1970’s has the word seen such a coordinated challenge to western supremacy in the world economy from developing countries” (The Guardian, April 2, 2013).
A blow to the Bretton Woods system ?
By stressing the importance of respecting the sovereignty of borrowing states, the absence of preconditions, and the promotion of currencies other than the dollar in member countries’ commercial transactions, these new instruments are truly innovative. As they allow countries in the Global South to access new lines of credit and trade facilities without having to adhere to reform obligations. However, they are not revolutionary.
In its operating procedure, the NDB does not really stand out from other similar institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), created in the same year at the initiative of Beijing (2014) nor does it differ significantly from other development banks linked to the traditional financial system, except for the official absence of macroeconomic and political prescriptions. Similar to the G20, the World Bank, and numerous regional and national development banks, the NBD shares a common dynamic which consists in financing infrastructure and energy projects to boost the growth of developing countries, notably through public-private partnership agreements. (Garcia, 2017 ; 2019 ; Garcia and Bond, 2019 ; Bond, 2022).
« Despite […] geopolitical expectations […], notes Ana Garcia, both the NDB and the CRA have proved to be complementary, and not in opposition, to existing multilateral institutions (2019). Furthermore, as stated by the first director of the institution before signing a partnership agreement with the World Bank, the NDB was not intended to become a »political bank" : “[It] will be guided by technical criteria to approve projects. Our constitutional agreement makes this point clear. We want to avoid over-politicizing decisions that are taking place in existing multilateral institutions”(quoted in Garcia, 2019).
The same applies to the CRA. Its founding agreement explicitly states that any borrower is obligated to request a « package of structural adjustments » from the IMF after receiving 30% of the borrowed amount. This is a way of reintroducing conditionality through the “side door”, after vehemently denouncing it (Garcia and Bond, 2019 ; Bond, 2022). As demonstrated by the pressure exerted by countries to increase their influence within international financial institutions, this example highlights the stark contrast between the rhetoric of the BRICS and their actual practices, an ambivalence that Patrick Bond (2023) describes as « talk left, walk right. » We will revisit this topic in more detail later.
A Sinocentric coalition
Another characteristic of the BRICS that puts into perspective the principles of equality and mutual benefit upon which their cooperation is founded is the absolute predominance of China, which is hardly comparable to a country of the global South, such as Russia. As a mean of illustration, China accounts for over 70% of the wealth produced by all the countries in the bloc (prior to its enlargement). Its GDP (2022) exceeds $18 trillion, while it is only about $3.4 trillion for India, $2.215 trillion for Russia, $1.924 trillion for Brazil, and barely $420 billion for South Africa. In other words, the Chinese economy is five times larger than that of India and respectively eight, nine, and almost forty-three times larger than that of Russia, Brazil, and South Africa [2].
This significant gap is explained by the level of industrial development in China. It can also be observed in the structure of trade between the Asian giant and the other historical members of the coalition, resembling a North-South or core-periphery relationship. While its trade with India is relatively balanced, Chinese exports to Russia, Brazil, and South Africa consist mainly of manufactured or semi-manufactured products, while Chinese imports from these countries are primarily raw materials such as minerals, oil, gas, and food products.
Given these evident imbalances, viewing the BRICS as a « solidarity group fighting imperialism » amounts to mystification, according to progressive journalist and activist Carlos Carcione. Indeed, despite the principles of strict equality among partners and mutual benefits upon which the alliance is founded, « the enormous inequalities within the BRICS make them functional to China’s plans and needs » (2023). This indicates that China has the capability to exert decisive and increasingly significant influence on the major directions taken by the BRICS to shape the associated institutions according to its interests.
This rationale is readily noticeable in the decision made by the bloc (also supported by Russia) to expand to include new members, despite strong resistance from India and Brazil, both of which eventually capitulated. The ‘illusive’ unanimity and handshakes that followed the announcement of the expansion poorly conceal the numerous fault lines among the coalition members (Stuenkel, 2023).
Rifts and divisions
The BRICS member countries’ rejection of sanctions against Russia, their departure from the Western stance on the Ukraine conflict, and their shared goal of reforming global financial institutions and reducing the dollar’s dominance, alongside their alignment on key UN issues, portray them as a united group with shared values and a cohesive vision in international relations, hinting at a cohesive bloc challenging Western powers.
The narrative of a confrontation between the West and the rest (« The West against the Rest ») is undeniably central to the discourses of Russian leaders and, to a lesser extent, Chinese ones. It reflects their desire to transform the group into a bloc of solidarity against hegemony, opposed to the so-called « collective West. » Regularly reminding responsibility of the West in the proliferation of conflicts and the century-old oppression of Southern peoples, this rhetoric is intended for the latter. It is a call for mobilization.
However, the other historical members of the BRICS do not view this alliance as an anti-Western bloc. Pragmatic, the Brazilian, Indian, and South African presidents have consistently reiterated this stance. While they contest the Western powers’ monopoly on decision-making in global affairs and assert their rightful place in global governance, Brazil, India, and South Africa wish to maintain good relations with the United States and Europe, which are major trading partners. Eager to preserve their autonomy and inclined to prioritize multiple alignments, these countries are engaged in various forms of strategic partnership with the North, including on military matters, such as the « Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, » or « Quad, » which includes the United States, Japan, Australia, and India in response to China’s growing power.
Here lies a first major fault line. It is expressed, among other things, in the long-lasting tensions existing between India and China but has also surfaced in the debates over the enlargement primarily advocated by Russia and China. Similarly, India and Brazil have long resisted it, fearing that their own influence would be diluted within an expanded group, (Stuenkel, 2023).
In the future, such an expansion could give rise to a second fault line within the group, opposing autocratic regimes against democracies. The entry of Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran into the coalition effectively places democratic governments (such as Brazil and South Africa) or those presenting themselves as such (like India) in a minority position within the expanded bloc. This is especially true since Argentina withdrew from the accession process under the decision of its new president, Javier Milei, who is much more concerned with strengthening his country’s ties with Washington and the IMF.
A third fault line, intersecting with the first, lies in the international status of its members, with Russia and China being both nuclear powers (alongside India) and permanent members of the Security Council. Faced with repeated demands from India and Brazil for permanent seats on the Security Council, China and Russia stand united, showing little willingness to share their privileges with new aspirants.
An opportunistic alliance
In this issue of Alternatives Sud, Laerto Apolináro Júnior and Giovana Dias Branco highlight the positions adopted by BRICS countries on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. They suggest that the alignment of these countries on various international issues is driven more by economic and geostrategic interests than by political or ideological motives. Indeed, it is the combination of pragmatic considerations, contingent interests, and meticulous sovereignty that guided the co-optation of new members and, conversely, motivated their adherence to the BRICS.
While this flexible coalition of actors with divergent interests undoubtedly seeks to address certain prominent imbalances at the international level, characterizing it as ’anti-imperialist’ due to leaders like Modi (India), Mohammed bin Salman (Saudi Arabia), and Sissi (Egypt), given their close alliances with the United States, would be, according to Prabhat Patnaik (2023), ’a gross overstatement’.
Moreover, what is the Russian aggression against Ukraine if not a war of imperial nature, or the proxy conflicts waged by Saudi Arabia and Iran, in disregard of the cherished principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty upheld by the BRICS ? Following the same logic, how can we characterize the war conducted in Tigray by the Ethiopian government ? Or the repression of the Uighur people by China ? And that of the Muslim population by India ?
As highlighted by Tithi Bhattacharya and Gareth Dale in this issue of Alternatives Sud, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Movement for a New International Economic Order were initially guided by robust values, ideology, and political commitments. These included the rejection of colonialism, condemnation of the Israeli occupation in Palestine and apartheid in South Africa, challenging socioeconomic injustices, asserting South-South solidarities, as well as promoting alternative development models such as resource nationalization, regulation of transnational corporations, debt cancellation, and technology transfer from wealthy countries.
This set of shared characteristics is not to be found in the BRICS+. The reluctance with which they condemned the Israeli invasion of Gaza (largely due to the close relationship between Modi’s India and the State of Israel, and the currently frozen rapprochement between the latter and Saudi Arabia) proves that point. Also, the nature of the economic relationships that the coalition members maintain with other Southern countries is far from the idea of South-South solidarity they champion.
« BRICS and Global South : Beneficial Partnership or Trapped Relationship ? »
Beyond the substantial resources in the form of loans, investments, aid, and service offers that they make available to developing countries, along with their denunciation of global imbalances and criticism of the double standards of the West, the rhetoric of « South-South cooperation » from the BRICS appeals to many developing countries scarred by decades of economic adjustments and debt with disastrous consequences for their populations. Moreover, BRICS members are not considered former colonial powers and are therefore immune to the resentment that fuels a rejection of the West in the Global South.
Drawing on the rhetoric of South-South solidarity cherished by former anti-colonial movements (mutual benefit, multilateralism, peaceful coexistence, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic justice, etc.), this discourse fuels the belief that economic relations forged between the BRICS and countries of the Global South would be less imbalanced, more equitable and aligned with the needs and aspirations of the populations of poorer countries and that The BRICS would be able nurture new practices of cooperation and development capable of addressing global socioeconomic inequalities. However, an analysis of this relationship reveals a different reality.
« A North-South matrix »
The first two decades of the 21st century have been characterized with an exponential growth in trade between the BRICS and African countries, as well as a significant increase in investments made in many African countries, along with substantial financial flows in the form of aid and loans. This deepening of relations suggests that emerging powers play a major role in the economic take-off of the continent and its development resurgence.
However, it is evident that the nature of this relationship tends to reproduce the traditional dichotomy between centres and peripheries, reinforcing the subordinate position of African countries in the international division of labour and locking them into an almost exclusive role as exporters of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods. For instance, Chinese exports to Africa consist of 95% processed goods, while primary products represent nearly 90% of African exports to China (mainly oil and minerals, accounting for 59% and 26% respectively in 2010). Chinese investments in Africa are also predominantly directed toward these sectors (oil, gas, mining industry, etc.), as well as energy and related infrastructure, which serve as their logistical platform. The same goes for Chinese aid and loans (CETRI, 2011 ; Dodd, 2020).
Even though they mainly export primary products to China (except for India), in their economic relations with African countries, the other historical members of the BRICS exhibit a similar North-South profile, albeit on a much smaller scale. India exports manufactured goods, pharmaceutical products, and services to Africa. Russia primarily exports weaponry, fertilizers, and certain advanced technologies (especially in the nuclear sector). Brazil and South Africa export manufactured goods, food products, and chemicals. In return, they import naturals resources from Africa, mainly gas, oil, minerals, and energy resources. Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa also direct most of their investments towards these sectors as well as infrastructure.
In both cases, the goal is to secure access to these essential resources for their own growth, stimulate the expansion of their own companies on the continent, and gain political influence. Projects funded by Brazil’s National Development Bank in Africa during Lula’s first two terms, presented under the label of South-South cooperation, were intended to enable Brazilian companies to expand their operations on the continent and support the country’s agribusiness by boosting food exports to these new markets (Amasi et al., 2015 ; Dodd, 2020).
The structure of trade, as well as the nature and target of investments between China and Latin America, are not significantly different, as highlighted by Maristella Svampa and Ariel Slipak in this issue of Alternatives Sud. Presented as complementary in official statements, this relationship is equally unbalanced. Not only does it tend to reinforce the extractivist matrix of the continent, at the expense of other activities with higher added value, but it also places Latin America in a new relationship of dependency. This is what Maristella Svampa and Ariel Slipak call the « commodities consensus, » which is on the verge of being replaced by a « decarbonization consensus » as the international race for sustainable energy sources intensifies within the framework of energy transition (see CETRI, 2023).
Similar accumulation and exploitation logics
Thus, far from being a « win-win » or mutually beneficial relationship, the « cooperation » between the BRICS and other developing countries is characterized by unequal exchange, resembling the North-South relationship. “Whereas the BRICS countries seek to assert themselves as a cohesive group in multilateral fora, in Africa each one has its own competitive strategy and approach. Thus in a broader context of capitalist accumulation, the BRICS are acting based on a logic of competition over natural resources and market access that is imperialistic in nature and is taking colonialism back to Africa in modern times” (Garcia, 2017).
Behind the rhetoric, the modus operandi is fundamentally the same. The logic of accumulation and exploitation is similar as it involves seizing control of local resources, promoting the expansion of their national economic champions, boosting their own growth, and finding new markets for their exports, which would potentially compromise the industrialization of other developing countries (Amisi et al., 2016 ; Garcia, 2017).
On the ground, the social and environmental effects of projects initiated and financed by the BRICS are the same : land and resource grabbing, dispossession of local communities, a race to the bottom in terms of social standards, and destruction of natural habitats. These projects provoke resistance from dispossessed communities and lead to a proliferation of socio-environmental conflicts, as evidenced by cases such as Chinese investments in Latin America and Brazilian investments in the Nacala logistics corridor in Mozambique [3].
In this regard, Baruti Amisi does not hesitate to compare the competition for African resources among BRICS countries and with the West to a new « scramble for Africa » : “As BRICS penetrate further into Africa, the winners consist of multinational and parastatal corporations, including some based in the industrialized countries [...] which purchase semi-processed inputs or finished goods from BRICS, along with local elites who lubricate the looting through corruption, cost overruns, and access to our cheapest electricity supplies” (Amisi et al., 2016).
Indeed, portrayed as an essential condition for diversification and economic development of the continent, this emphasis on infrastructure could meet a real need. Similarly, access to new channels of unconditional financing provides more political leeway to Southern countries. However, these directed financings primarily serve the interests of the BRICS and their companies. Viewed from this angle, the construction of roads, dams, ports, or railways hardly differs from the grand colonial projects of yesteryears, as noted by Baruti Amisi : “it’s about « extracting primary products for the global market as quickly as possible » (Ibid.).
Similarly, the official absence of conditionality does not come without its share of perverse effects. Among other things, it allows authoritarian regimes to relieve themselves from their obligations regarding human rights and environmental protection. Furthermore, this absence of conditionality is not absolute, as demonstrated by Chinese financing implicitly linked to the recipient country’s refusal to recognize Taiwan or the conditions of access to the CRA (see above). Moreover, it does not escape the astute observer that Chinese financing and investments (and sometimes those of other BRICS countries) are almost always « conditioned » on privileged access to natural resources (Garcia, 2017 ; Dodd, 2020).
While their terms of access may seem more favourable, the loans granted to other developing countries by these new donors are not without consequences. With the potential to propel developing countries into a new spiral of debt and dependency, this new form of debt also can « reinforce a productive matrix based on export of primary goods and therefore annul or weaken the opportunities for developing a more diversified production framework [...]. Given the volatility of commodity prices, this means that African economies have become even more vulnerable » (Garcia, 2017).
A ’neoliberalism with Southern characteristics’
Already in 2013, Indian economist Vishay Prashad expressed doubts about the ability, if not the willingness of this coalition to radically challenge neoliberal globalization. The one who had long considered this nascent bloc as the founding act of a new international economic order bitterly noted that the elites of these countries, having emerged as winners from several decades of neoliberal policies, were much more interested in joining the existing system of global governance rather than transforming it.
In addition to the lack of radical reforms mainly focused on better sharing of responsibilities, the absence of an alternative economic ideology advocated by coalition members, and its tepid opposition to the unilateralism of the United States and NATO, Prashad also pointed out the continuity within them of policies primarily focused on the sale of commodities, maintaining low wages, and recycling surplus transformed into credits offered to the North, at the expense of their own population. This amounted to the continuation of a model he did not hesitate to qualify as « neoliberalism with Southern characteristics » (2013).
A decade later, this observation remains fundamentally unchanged. Declaration after declaration, the BRICS have consistently positioned themselves as defenders of free trade. In this regard, Brazil stands out as a prime example. Regardless of the government in power, the liberalization of agricultural trade is at the core of its international priorities. Believing that trade barriers (of any kind, including environmental regulations) and subsidies unfairly undermine the competitiveness of its significant agricultural sector, Brazil’s efforts at the WTO and the ad hoc coalitions it has formed since the early 2000s have consistently aimed to achieve a global agricultural market that is free and unrestricted.
It is clear and evident that this international policy cannot be interpreted as a defense of the ’interests’ of Brazilian society ‘as a whole’ against Western or imperial capitalism,« sociologist William Robinson ironically states. Instead, it illustrates the political influence of the agro-industrial complex, which the author sees as a component of the vast network of transnational actors, including “national states and inter and supra-national institutions through which the transnational capitalist class (TCC) and its political agents and allies organize global capitalism and the conditions for transnational accumulation in pursuit of their class and group interests » (2015).
Such an interpretation, which challenges binary North-South oppositions and « campist » interpretations, helps to account for the absence or near absence of social and environmental criteria regulating investments by emerging economies elsewhere in the South. These criteria are often abandoned, in the name of strict respect for sovereignty, to the discretion of recipient states. It also explains the reluctance of the BRICS to address inequalities within their own borders, which are among the highest in the world, their disregard for environmental issues, and their reluctance to support certain essential international reforms.
The same applies in the fight against tax havens, which serves as a prime example of the BRICS’ ’talk left, walk right’ approach. While they loudly claim to reform the international financial architecture, they have, however, never presented a plan to combat the offshore finance sector. Moreover, they continue to be listed among the main users of these tax havens. Brazil is currently the second-largest borrower in offshore markets. China, through its state-owned enterprises, is one of the largest clients of banks in the British Virgin Islands, while India extensively uses Mauritius to channel and repatriate its capital (mainly from Africa). The use of tax havens by Russian oligarchs is well-known, where hydrocarbon trade often occurs through these opaque jurisdictions, which also play a central role in circumventing sanctions.
Furthermore, it is not irrelevant to recall that nearly $7.8 trillion, representing 8% of the world’s produced wealth and 40% of multinational corporations’ profits, are concealed in these banks. And these banks constitute one of the primary instruments for siphoning wealth from the Global South [4]. In short, as noted by the authors of an article dedicated to this issue, « BRICS countries are just as implicated in the offshore world as the Western economies they lambast. The reality is that their governments and political elites both benefit from and need the offshore financial world » (Binder and Soares de Oliveira, 2023).
As highlighted by Ana Garcia et al. (2017 ; 2023), bilateral investment agreements (BIAs) signed between BRICS and developing countries hardly differ, if at all, from those promoted by Northern countries as they are primarily designed to protect their investments and the interests of their multinational corporations (which accounted for 24% of the world’s 500 largest companies in 2016) against potential disputes with local authorities or populations. Just like the free trade agreements that BRICS countries are increasingly pursuing, these BIAs also tend to « maintain the neoliberal order » by imposing a legal framework favourable to investors and stimulating competition among resource-rich countries.
Leading to the same socio-economic, political, and ecological disruptions, each of these agreements contribute to exacerbating the systemic crises of capitalism. And the entry of countries like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, among the world’s leading producers of hydrocarbons and major users of tax havens, or countries like Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt, known for their catastrophic records in terms of social and human rights (like the first two), will not give a progressive inflection to the trajectory of the BRICS+. Instead, it could accelerate the shift towards a multipolar and authoritarian capitalism, diametrically opposed to the founding project that animated the protagonists of the Bandung Conference.
Against multipolar capitalism, rebuilding internationalism.
« Since the last BRICS meeting, » notes Branko Marcetik, « Western commentators have oscillated between alarmism and irony. Some lament the end of a world dominated by the West and denounce the Chinese hydra. Others downplay the significance of an alliance that now encompasses half the planet. These reactions reflect the fear of Western elites of seeing the United States lose its superpower status (particularly military and monetary). They prevent a clear-eyed view of the ongoing dynamic - that of a gradual multipolarization of the world, without a sharp break with the United States, which maintains good relations with the majority of the new BRICS members. [...]. The main risk of this alliance lies rather in the little change it can bring about. Would a multipolar order challenge the nature of the dominant economic system, and the asymmetry between weak and powerful states ? » (2023)
One may doubt it, given the trajectory of the BRICS, their orientations, and the nature of their relations with other countries in the Global South. Their rise in power certainly contributes to a necessary rebalancing of power dynamics on a global level and to the widening of political manoeuvring room for Southern states in the face of pressures and injunctions from Northern countries and international financial institutions. The fact that forty countries have expressed interest in joining the BRICS, in addition to the twenty countries that officially submitted their candidacy before the Johannesburg summit, is significant. It illustrates how profound the rejection of the Western-dominated international order is in the rest of the world, as well as the attraction to a multipolar world. This trend deserves careful consideration.
Thus, there is no evidence suggesting that we are moving towards greater socio-economic justice. Although they advocate for a better sharing of roles and responsibilities at the international level and challenge the hegemony of the dollar, the BRICS show little inclination to deeply reform the international economic system in favor of better wealth redistribution to the benefit of the poorest countries. On the contrary, the relationships that BRICS members have with their hinterlands and countries in the Global South tend to de facto reproduce the colonial-type domination relations that characterize the North-South relationship. The effects on the ground are the same.
In this regard, far from challenging the structural injustices exacerbated by globalization, the BRICS+ risk amplifying them : « The pattern remains much the same, warns Souleymane Gassama : a land of promise, youth, and still abundant resources, victim of structural fragility in many respects despite the differences in wealth between countries and regions, the [African] continent continues to be perceived as an opportunity, with a mixture of brutal capitalist predation associated with soft power, where the newcomers aim to also play on emotions and their lack of colonial baggage » (RIS, 2023).
We must also bring to the attention of those who view the BRICS+ as a stabilizing force that Russia and several of the new members (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia) have been or are currently involved in deadly conflicts, directly, by proxies, or power politics. And that the attractiveness of the BRICS+ is not unrelated to the poor record displayed by several of its members in terms of democracy and human rights, their fierce repression of any form of dissent, or even their overt rejection of « universalism, » portrayed as a neo-colonial imposition and instrumentalized as such to justify the crushing of any inclination towards protest.
As early as 2015, William Robinson expressed his concerns about the tendency of many left-wing activists and intellectuals to interpret the BRICS as a progressive and/or anti-imperialist alternative to the unipolar world dominated by the West. This interpretation risks turning them into supporters of repressive regimes and the transnational elites that govern them, who precisely derive their wealth from integration into the global market.
Other than the fact that this perspective doesn’t align with reality, the main goal for the BRICS is to « construct a more expansive and balanced capitalism » (2015). Such an interpretation blurs the landmarks of the global left and contributes to a Manichaean view of the world, reducing international relations to an irreducible opposition between blocs. It also feeds identity politics, presupposing that there is a priority convergence of interests between social categories within the same geographical framework. In doing so, it weakens the essential solidarities among victims of inter-imperialist competition pitting the North against emerging local powers.
As explained by Indian feminist activist Kavita Krishnan in this edition of Alternatives Sud, uncritically adhering to the concept of multipolarity, a new rallying cry of the Indian left, leads to abandoning natural solidarities (such as with the Ukrainian resistance) and even to reproducing the rhetoric of the most reactionary Hindu right, which excels in instrumentalizing this notion for electoral purposes. Faced with this deleterious trend, she urges the global left to reset its moral compass to correct the « catastrophic course that has led it to speak the same language as tyrants ».
Instead of celebrating the advent of a conflictual multipolarity resulting from reactionary clash of civilizations theories, the left, both in the North and the South, would be better inspired to return to its fundamental principles. This means striving to build robust bridges between populations fighting for their rights : Palestinian resistance fighters, Ukrainian defenders, Russian pacifists, Iranian feminists, landless peasants in Brazil, Uighurs in China, human rights activists in the Arab world, impoverished workers in the United States, Indian Muslims, rural and indigenous communities in Africa, Latin America, and Asia who resist land grabs, the advance of extractivist models, and large-scale infrastructure projects, among other issues.
Humanity’s salvation does not depend on the BRICS, as hinted by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2024). Instead, it relies on the ability of progressive forces to establish the groundwork for a new internationalism that avoids falling into binary readings of the world, which are sources of both tensions and divisions within their own ranks.
Translation from French : Maxime De Crop.